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The utilization of emergency services in the United States has increased substantially 
in the last 20 years. Despite this trend, the number of emergency departments (EDs) 
has not increased on par with the volume of patients that seek emergency services. 
Hospitals are expanding the provision of emergency services through freestanding 
emergency departments (FSEDs), independent facilities managed by hospitals (but not 
physically attached to them) that can provide the same services as traditional EDs. It is 
not clear how the entry or exit of EDs affect emergency care utilization. I analyze the 
effect of ED entry and exit on ED utilization and emergency-related health care 
outcomes. In addition, I analyze how FSEDs affect the risk profile of the inpatient 
population at hospitals with FSEDs nearby and at hospitals that operate FSEDs. I find 
an asymmetric effect on incumbent ED number of visits of entry and exit of EDs. 
Increases in the number of visits due to ED entry are not correlated with changes in 
emergency-related mortality rates. Hospitals that operate FSEDs have an inpatient 
population with higher acuity than hospitals that don’t operate FSEDs, and hospitals 
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Emergency departments (ED) are key providers of health services, particularly for 
the uninsured and low-income population (Billings et al., 2000a). EDs are not only 
effective settings to treat urgent care, but also are providers of ambulatory care (Institute 
of Medicine, 2007). The ED is a significant source of patients for hospitals (Morganti et 
al., 2013) and inpatient admissions originated in the ED have a higher margin than 
inpatient admissions originated elsewhere (Henneman et al., 2009). Estimates show a 7.8 
percent profit margin for EDs in 2009. ED utilization increased substantially in the last 
20 years, and is expected to increase as health insurance coverage increases (Skinner et 
al., 2014; Taubman et al., 2014); the introduction of the Affordable Care Act did not slow 
the pace of ED utilization, but reduced the proportion of ED utilization by uninsured 
individuals (Singer et al., 2019). Despite this trend, the number of EDs has not increased 
on par with the number of visits (R. Y. Hsia et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014). A higher 
volume of patients to EDs can lead to crowding. Crowded EDs have lower quality of 
care, lower patient satisfaction, poorer patient outcomes, and higher rates of patients who 
leave without being seen (Derlet et al., 2000; Sanchez et al., 2006; Weiss et al., 2005). A 
pressing question for both providers and policymakers is how the US health care system 
will either accommodate an increasing demand for emergency services (from either 
population growth or aging, or shortages of primary care) while maintaining or 




emergency services. If the latter is insufficient, careful regulation of the supply of 
emergency services could prove more effective. 
Hospitals are the principal providers of emergency services. However, the supply 
of emergency services does not necessarily follow the supply of other hospital services. 
Hospitals have been expanding ED capacity at the original location to meet increasing 
demand and to open access to inpatient services (Melnick et al., 2004). Some hospitals 
have expanded ED capacity by constructing satellite freestanding emergency departments 
(FSEDs) (Berger, 2011). The number of satellite FSEDs in the United States has more than 
tripled in the last decades (Patidar et al., 2016). Such facilities are owned and operated by 
hospitals but physically detached from the hospital campus. These facilities are generally 
open 24 hours a day and 7 days a week and are fully capable of treating high acuity patients 
(ACEP, 2013). Satellite FSEDs provide timely care similar to hospital-based EDs (Baehr 
et al., 2020b) Autonomous FSEDs are, on the other hand, owned and operated 
independently by groups not affiliated with a hospital, and may or may not provide the 
same level of care than hospital-affiliated emergency departments. With satellite FSEDs, 
hospitals can compete in different geographical markets that are otherwise underserved or 
have potential for market entry. In addition to FSEDs, other developments such as urgent 
care centers and retail clinics provide substitute services for ED use, in particular for low-
complexity and low-acuity patients (D. Alexander et al., 2017). 
The hospital market has faced several changes in recent years: mergers and 
consolidations (Cuellar et al., 2003), entries and exits (MedPAC, 2012), and the elimination 
of state-level Certificates of Need for the construction of hospitals (Conover et al., 1998), 




players in the health services field, that are not necessarily covered by the supply 
regulations on inpatient services. For instance, the entry of freestanding ambulatory surgery 
centers is associated with lower revenues and profits at incumbent hospitals (Carey et al., 
2011), and the entrance of cardiac specialty hospitals reduced health expenditures without 
worsening clinical outcomes (Barro et al., 2006). There is still a potential for new 
developments in health care that compete for services traditionally offered by hospitals.  
Previous studies have shown that changes in the supply of health care influence 
access to care and health outcomes. Changes in the supply of hospital services affect access 
to health care and health outcomes. Some studies show limited decreases in access to care 
after hospital closures (Buchmueller et al., 2006) while other show more substantial 
decreases in access to care (Bazzoli et al., 2012; Wishner et al., 2016). Increased distance 
to hospitals is associated with increased mortality rates from myocardial infarctions and 
unintentional injuries (Buchmueller et al., 2006). Hospitals that are less efficient or in more 
competitive markets are more likely to close (Abraham et al., 2007; Capps et al., 2010). 
Closure of rural hospitals is associated with increased mortality from time-sensitive health 
conditions (Carroll, 2019) and has negative welfare effects for patients in the order of 
millions of dollars per hospital closed (McNamara, 1999); however, costs in surviving 
hospitals decreased (Lindrooth et al., 2003) and social welfare may increase if relatively 
inefficient hospitals close (Capps et al., 2010). With respect to  other changes in health care 
supply, closures of large obstetric units led to increases in neonatal and perinatal mortality 
in the short run, but no changes in the medium run (Kozhimannil et al., 2018; Lorch et al., 
2013). In addition to these direct effects, hospital closures have spillover effects: hospital 




remaining hospitals (Wu, 2008), and lower costs per adjusted admission through increases 
in inpatient admissions in neighboring hospitals (Lindrooth et al., 2003).  
Emergency department closures are associated with increases in ambulance 
diversion and worse health outcomes.(R. Y.-J. Hsia et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014; Shen et 
al., 2012, 2016; Sun et al., 2006). Restrictions on the entry of EDs, such as Certificates of 
Need (CON) increased length of stay for ED patients (Paul et al., 2014). EDs have lost 
visits to emergency care and convenience clinics that provide services that substitute 
emergency care (D. Alexander et al., 2017). In addition, the expansion of telehealth has 
provided access to healthcare to patients who would otherwise seek care at EDs (Ashwood 
et al., 2017; Champagne-Langabeer et al., 2019; Heath et al., 2009) and access to 
emergency medicine specialists to rural hospitals (Natafgi et al., 2018). On the other hand, 
emergency services often are over-utilized: the use of emergency services for non-urgent 
conditions increases health care costs and contributes to ED crowding (Bamezai et al., 
2005; Billings et al., 2000b; Derlet et al., 2000; Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2013).  
With respect to the expansion of emergency services via FSEDs, previous research 
shows a particular trend. Hospitals tend to open FSEDs in highly affluent areas with a 
larger proportion of white inhabitants (A. J. Alexander et al., 2019; Dark et al., 2017; 
Patidar et al., 2016), in areas with a payer mix biased towards commercial enrollees (Baehr 
et al., 2020a; Schuur et al., 2017), and areas further away from public transit lines in urban 
areas (Carlson et al., 2019). The introduction of FSEDs increased emergency care prices 
(Ho et al., 2017), is associated with higher Medicare costs (Patidar et al., 2017b) and higher 
ED utilization in commercially insured patients (Ho et al., 2019), but did not diminish the 




and hospital-based ED patients shows that FSED patients are more likely to be women, 
white, employed, and privately insured (Burke et al., 2019; Pines et al., 2018); hospital-
based EDs are more likely to be admitted for inpatient care and stay a longer time in the 
ED (Burke et al., 2019; Pines et al., 2018; Simon et al., 2018). Following this evidence, the 
2017 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission recommended a cut in reimbursement rates 
to FSEDs that open within 6 miles from a hospital-based ED (Freeman et al., 2020; 
MedPAC, 2017). On the other hand, supporters of FSEDs argue that they have the potential 
to expand access to emergency care (Harish et al., 2016) and provide timelier care than 
hospital-based EDs (Baehr et al., 2020b). Even if FSED entry occurs in more affluent areas, 
it could respond to a need for a higher supply of emergency services: for instance, if EDs 
are operating at capacity, or if the distance traveled to the ED compromises timely care. 
This can be particularly relevant in rural areas: the entrance of an FSED was associated 
with reducing access times in a regional emergency medical system (Lawner et al., 2016).  
There is anecdotal evidence that the convenience and low utilization of FSEDs offers 
additional benefits over hospital-based EDs for managing pharmacological crises (Tucci, 
Moiz Ahmed, et al., 2017) or psychiatric health emergencies (Tucci, Ahmed, et al., 2017).  
This dissertation studies the effects of geographical competition of emergency 
services in health and economic outcomes. In particular, I study entry and exit of EDs and 
FSED and how they are related to changes in emergency services and inpatient utilization, 
and changes in health outcomes. As response time is critical in emergent conditions, easy 
access to emergency services is key for appropriate provision of emergency care. At the 
same time, if EDs are used inappropriately to provide care that is better provided elsewhere, 




healthcare resources. It is not my intent to discuss the appropriateness of a specific 
emergency service utilization, but to shed light on how geographic competition in 
emergency services could lead to emergency services utilization that doesn’t correspond to 
improved health outcomes.   
In Chapter 1 I analyze the changes in ED utilization after entry and exit of 
emergency departments in the geographic area of incumbent EDs. Following the 
transportation literature, where increases in installed capacity induce utilization (Goodwin 
et al., 2003; Noland, 2000; Weis et al., 2009), I test whether the local availability of 
emergency services increases utilization, or if the lack thereof decreases utilization. In 
particular, I analyze if the entrance or exit of EDs within a certain distance from incumbent 
EDs decreases or increases the number of visits of the incumbent ED. In this Chapter I 
introduce the National Emergency Departments Inventory (NEDI-USA), the main data 
source for this dissertation. 
In Chapter 2 I assess whether the change in the local availability of emergency 
services is associated with health outcomes. With the results from Chapter 1 I calculate the 
total change in the number of visits diverted to or from the ED entrance of exit net of the 
expected number of visits of the incumbent ED. This measure shows the aggregate change 
in visits of ED entrance or exit. With these aggregated results I estimate the association 
between aggregated change in visits and mortality rates of emergency-related conditions. 
This is an indirect test of induced demand in emergency services. If the availability of 
emergency services induces demand, then, all else equal, changes in the supply of 
emergency care change access to ED services but have little effect in health outcomes. This 




asymmetric information between providers and patients or from a behavioral change from 
providers facing a reduction in revenue: in this case, the source of the induced demand 
relies on the availability and convenience of ED services.  
Lastly, Chapter 3 focuses on FSEDs and the effects of FSED location. Much has 
been studied about FSED location (in more affluent areas, as described before) and how 
they affect the provision emergency services (raise prices and costs and don’t alleviate 
congestion, as described before), but it is yet not understood how they affect the provision 
of inpatient services. As EDs are a source of patients to the hospital (Morganti et al., 2013), 
FSEDs could serve as a mechanism to compete for inpatient services in a different 
geographical area than the parent hospital. Given what the research shows about FSED 
placement, it is possible that FSEDs are used as a tool for selecting good (i.e. low acuity 
or commercially insured) patients. I use information from Medicare Acute Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System to assess how the presence of FSED is associated with case 
and payer mix in hospitals nearby, and how operating an FSED is associated with case and 
payer mix in the parent hospital.  
There are several policy implications of these questions. As some hospitals close 
and others expand via FSEDs, it has become paramount that policymakers understand the 
direct and indirect implications of the changes in the availability of emergency services 
while facing a constant increase in the demand for emergency services. Evidence of 
induced demand of emergency services due to the location of new EDs or evidence of 
cream skimming from FSEDs could influence policies on regulations for the entry of new 




emergency or inpatient services, policies that help guide FSED locations to underserved 





CHAPTER 1. ENTRY AND EXIT OF EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS AND 
EMERGENCY SERVICES UTILIZATION 
 
Framework and Analytical Approach 
Following the literature on hospital competition (Dranove et al., 2000; 
Gowrisankaran et al., 2003; Town et al., 2001), I model the emergency care market as 
monopolistic competition with differentiated products. Given the nature of emergency 
services, where timely access to care is critical to good health outcomes, the source of 
differentiation among EDs is geographical location. The literature extensively supports the 
importance of distance in emergency services: longer distances to EDs are associated with 
increases in mortality rates  and decreases in utilization (Buchmueller et al., 2006; Lee et 
al., 2007; Liu et al., 2014). Other studies have found that the distance to the provider is 
among the relevant characteristics affecting the choice of an inpatient provider (Tay, 2003).  
I borrow from the transportation literature to test for induced demand in the 
emergency services market. In this literature, the Braess paradox (Murchland, 1970) 
describes how increasing lanes on a highway does not reduce traffic congestion, but 
reducing lanes does. This phenomenon is well studied in transportation (Noland, 2000; 
Rapoport et al., 2009); as more driving lanes become available in a road, the incentives to 
use such road increase. These incentives divert drivers from alternative routes and 
alternative modes of transportation. Conversely, when a highway lane is closed, incentives 
to use the highway decrease, and some drivers take alternative routes or find alternative 




In this context, a recently opened ED will attract patients from incumbent EDs and 
will create incentives for patients –who otherwise are not using emergency services- to use 
emergency services. Conversely, a closed ED will divert some patients to other open 
incumbent EDs and will stop other patients –who otherwise would have used emergency 
services at the closed ED- to not use emergency services. By itself, the existence of an 
increase or decrease in visits due to the entry or exit of EDs doesn’t indicate induced 
demand. For instance, in a previously underserved area (where EDs are few and far 
between, or where the installed capacity of EDs is low), the increase in visits after opening 
an ED could be evidence of pent-up demand. In a similar fashion, a decrease in visits after 
an ED closure could be evidence of lack of access for patients with truly emergent 
conditions. Everything else equal, these previous cases would affect emergency-related 
health outcomes.  If a new ED facilitates access to emergency care in an otherwise 
underserved area, one would expect a reduction in mortality rates of conditions that could 
be treated successfully at an ED. In the case of an ED exit, one would expect an increase 
in mortality rates. I test for induced demand by estimating the correlation between the 
changes in predicted visits due to entry and exit of EDs and changes in mortality rates of 
emergency-related conditions; under the hypothesis of induced demand, this correlation is 
zero. 
Following a circular Salop model (Salop, 1979), I model the emergency services 
market as EDs competing for patients in a market where prices are homogeneous and the 
source of product differentiation comes from the firms’ geographical location. A violation 
of the price homogeneity assumption implies that product differentiation among EDs is not 




price elasticity of emergency care utilization are low (-0.04 in Ellis et al., 2017), which 
gives credence to the price homogeneity assumption.  
Heterogeneous consumers are located in a circle of radius 𝑚, following a 
distribution of consumer characteristics 𝑍 with CDF 𝐹(𝑍; 𝛩) and PDF 𝑓(𝑍; 𝛩) where 
parameter 𝛩 denotes consumer preferences. 𝑁𝑚 number of EDs are located along this circle 
and compete for patients based on their location.  For simplification, I assume firms follow 
the maximal differentiation principle (Hotelling, 1929) and they locate equidistant from 
each other, at a normalized average distance 2𝜋𝑚 𝑁𝑚⁄ . Consumers have unit demands and 
derive utility 𝑢 from using emergency services. However, consumers have a threshold 
?̅?(?̅?, ℎ) at which they decide to use emergency services. This threshold depends positively 
on  ?̅?, the distance to the closest ED, and negatively on ℎ ∈ 𝑍, a privately-observed level 
of health status complexity. All else equal, a longer distance to an ED increases the 
threshold and reduces the likelihood of a consumer using emergency services. More 
complex health status decreases the threshold and increases the likelihood of a consumer 
using emergency services. 
A consumer located at distance 𝑑 between EDs 𝑖 and 𝑗 is indifferent between both 
EDs if this condition holds: 
 𝑢 − 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑑 = 𝑢 − 𝑝𝑗 − (2𝜋𝑚 𝑁𝑚⁄ − 𝑑) ≥ ?̅?(?̅?, ℎ) (1) 
 
where 2𝜋𝑚 is the length of the circumference of the circle with radius 𝑚. An interior 




threshold low enough for them to use emergency care. I denote the set of consumers for 
which this happens as 𝛶. The interior solution for 𝑑 is 
 
𝑑 =






Since product differentiation comes from geographic location, other characteristics such as 
prices are determined homogenous, so 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗 . As ED 𝑖 serves patients on both sides of 
the circle, the volume 𝑉𝑖 of patients ED 𝑖 serves is given by 
 








 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑄(𝑍, 𝑁; 𝛩, 𝑚) (4)  
 
where 𝑄(⋅) is a general function that relates consumer characteristics, the number of 
competing EDs, and the size of the market. The Salop model directly implies that 
𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑁⁄ < 0; at the same time, changes in 𝑁 with a fixed 𝑚 relaxes the constraint at which 
patients use emergency care. The effect of 𝑚 on the number of visits is unclear: a larger 𝑚 
implies a larger market for an ED but increases competition by increasing the number of 
EDs in the market.  
 𝑁 changes according to the number of entries 𝐸 and exits 𝑋 of EDs. I use distance 
among EDs to identify entry and exit of competing EDs of incumbent ED 𝑖. Let 𝔸𝑖
𝑚 be the 
area of a circle of radius 𝑚 around incumbent ED 𝑖. The set 𝕆𝑖𝑡
𝑚 ⊂ 𝔸𝑖









𝑚 = {𝑗: 𝑗 ∉ 𝕆𝑖𝑡−1
𝑚 ∧ 𝑗 ∈ 𝕆𝑖𝑡1
𝑚 } 
𝕏𝑖𝑡
𝑚 = {𝑗: 𝑗 ∈ 𝕆𝑖𝑡−1




The number of competing EDs of incumbent ED at a radius 𝑚 in time 𝑡 is given by 
 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑚: |𝕆𝑖𝑡
𝑚|  = |𝔼𝑖𝑡
𝑚| − |𝕏𝑖𝑡
𝑚| + 𝑁𝑖𝑡−1





𝑚  (5) 
 
Methods  
Without defined functional forms for 𝑄(⋅), I estimate the number of visits of ED 𝑖  
at a radius 𝑚 in time 𝑡 by a linear approximation of (4) combined with (5): 
 𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡






𝑚 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 (6) 
 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a set of consumer and market characteristics that shift demand and costs, 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑚 
is the number of competing EDs in a circle of radius 𝑚, 𝜆𝑡 controls for any underlying 
trend in emergency services utilization, 𝜂𝑖 captures time-invariant characteristics of ED 𝑖, 
and 𝑖𝑡 includes unobserved time-varying characteristics that affect the number of visits. 
By the Salop model and (5), 𝛿1 < 0 and 𝛿2 > 0 as ED entries (exits) increase (decrease) 
competition and decrease (increase) visits for ED 𝑖, respectively. Parameter 𝛿3 indicates 
the effect of lagged competition on visits, and it is expected to be non-positive. 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 




subsequent number of visits of both entry and exit (a negative effect if entry, and a positive 
effect if exit). The role of 𝑚 in (6) comes at a trade-off: a larger 𝑚 implies a higher 𝑁𝑚 
and therefore potentially higher 𝐸𝑚 and 𝑋𝑚, but the marginal ED competitor has a smaller 
effect on visits. 
Equation (6) can be estimated with a fixed effects (FE) model. This model is 
equivalent to a difference-in-differences model with several time periods and treatments 
(in our case, entry and exit of EDs) occurring at different time periods. However, the 
individual 𝜂𝑖 effects may be random instead of fixed; then the appropriate way to estimate 
(6) is with a random effects (RE) model. I use a Mundlak test (Mundlak, 1978) to identify 
whether FE or RE are appropriate. The initial parameters of interest from equation (6) are 
{𝛿1, 𝛿2, 𝛿3}. A strict exogeneity assumption must be satisfied for these parameters to be 
estimated without bias (Wooldridge, 2002): given the fixed effect 𝜂𝑖, the error term 𝑖 and 
the independent variables 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and particularly {𝐸𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑖𝑡−1} are uncorrelated. However, 
entry and exit of EDs can be endogenous to visits: an ED with a high number of visits may 
signal to other competitors that there are positive profits in a certain geographic area, hence 
inducing ED entry. The variables 𝑍𝑖𝑡 may not capture unobserved economic conditions that 
simultaneously causes low visits and ED exits.  I use an instrumental variable approach to 
correct for these sources of bias due to endogeneity of ED entry and exit. However, the 
results from this approach are local, in the sense that the estimates will show the effect of 
entry and exit on visits for those EDs for which the instruments induced the entry or exit 
(Angrist et al., 2012; Imbens et al., 1994). Larger standard errors and a less efficient 




My first instrument follows the literature of hospital entry and competition 
(Abraham et al., 2007). I use the Land and Property Value price index calculated by the 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Davis & Palumbo, 2008; Davis et al., 2007; Davis, 
Lehnert, et al., 2008). This index tracks the changes in land prices for all states, Washington 
DC, and 46 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) The index is calculated at the state and 
metropolitan area levels; I use population weights to extrapolate to the county level. The 
identifying assumption for this instrument is that changes in land prices change the cost of 
opening EDs and the opportunity cost of leaving EDs open, but do not directly affect visits 
after controlling for other demand shifters. The second instrument follows the literature 
that assesses peer effects (Mora et al., 2013), a strategy that can be summarized by the 
phrase “the friends of my friends that are not my friends.” For an ED 𝑖 with neighbors 
(open or closed) EDs 𝑗, I use the aggregate visits of EDs 𝑘 that are neighbors of EDs 𝑗  but 
are not neighbors of ED 𝑖. The identifying assumption for this instrument is that the market 
conditions of EDs 𝑘, summarized in their number of visits, are correlated with the number 
of visits of EDs 𝑗 but not with the number of visits of ED 𝑖 . I test for the validity (over-
identification, weakness, and endogeneity of instrumented variables) of both instruments. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
The main data source for this dissertation is the National Emergency Departments 
Inventory (NEDI-USA), a survey undertaken by the Emergency Medicine Network at the 
Massachusetts General Hospital (Sullivan et al., 2015). The NEDI-USA compendium has 
information of all EDs in the United States, biennially from 2001 to 2013 (plus an 




hospital EDs (Army, Navy, Veteran Affairs, etc.) and specialty hospital EDs (psychiatric, 
chemical dependency, etc.), I focus on EDs that attend to general emergency patients and 
are available to the public. In particular, the dataset has information on ED characteristics 
and the hospitals with which they are affiliated (critical access, academic, freestanding, 
trauma level, etc.), the yearly number of visits per year, and geographical location (rurality, 
latitude and longitude). In addition, the NEDI-USA dataset includes an indicator for 
whether the ED is in operation, or if the ED opened or closed between each survey. For 
FSEDs, NEDI-USA compiles information on FSEDs’ parent hospital. The definition of an 
FSED is not standard across states (Herscovici et al., 2020), but in the NEDI-USA data is 
defined as a multi-specialty EDs, open 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, that is affiliated 
to a hospital but not physically attached to it. These data have been used in other 
publications related to emergency services utilization (Freeman et al., 2020; Herscovici et 
al., 2020; Muelleman et al., 2010; Patidar et al., 2016, 2017b; Sullivan et al., 2012). 
 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics of the EDs and FSEDs used in this 
dissertation, from 2005 and 2013. The number of hospital-based EDs decreased slightly 
between 2005 and 2013; this decline is concentrated in rural and non-metropolitan areas. 
These numbers follow the trend in hospitals closures seen since 2005 (The Cecil G Sheps 
Center for Health Services Research at the University of North Carolina, 2021). The 
number of metropolitan hospital-based EDs increased 4.2 percent during the period. 
Despite these decreases in the number of hospital-based EDs, the total number of visits has 
increased across the board in hospital-based EDs in any location. The number of FSEDs 




Despite the small decrease in hospital-based EDs, the number of visits at these 
locations between 2005 and 2013 increased by 19.3 percent in EDs in all areas, and by 23.3 
percent in metropolitan areas. The number of visits in rural EDs shows a moderate increase 
from 2005 to 2012 and a sharp decrease in 2013, for a net increase of 2 percent during the 
period. There is also an increase in concentration of hospital-based EDs visits in 
metropolitan areas, from 81.3 percent in 2005 to 84.1 percent in 2013. The number of visits 
in FSEDs increased by 200.1 percent between 2005 and 2013. Figure 1 shows the regional 
distribution of FSEDs in 2005 and 2013. Most FSEDs are located in metropolitan areas. 
Growth in the number of FSEDs is concentrated in six states (Texas, Ohio, Florida, 
Maryland, and Michigan), while North Carolina, Illinois, Kentucky, Colorado, and 
Washington saw larger increases in visits than other states (Figure 2). 
In addition to the NEDI-USA data, I use information from the 2005-2013 Small 
Area Health Insurance Estimates and Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates programs 
from the US Census Bureau as county-level demand shifters. In particular, I use population, 
number of people in poverty, median household income, and number of people without 
health insurance to control for individual characteristics that influence the demand for 
emergency services. Previous literature has found that primary care (Billings et al., 2000a), 
and care provided at medical homes (David et al., 2015), urgent care clinics (Weinick et 
al., 2010), and retail clinics (D. Alexander et al., 2017; Mehrotra et al., 2008) are imperfect 
substitutes of emergency services. To capture the influence of health care that may 
substitute for emergency services, I use the Area Resource Health Files (AHRF) to obtain 






Figure 3 shows the distribution of the distance from an ED to the closest neighbor 
ED in 2013, the last year of the sample. The median distance from an open ED to the closest 
open neighbor is 9.4 miles. Because urban areas are denser, the distance between EDs is 
shorter: a median distance of 3.8 miles in metropolitan areas, while the median distance of 
EDs in rural areas is 17.1 miles. These results have several implications for the choice of 
𝑚 in the estimation of (6): for some EDs, a sufficiently small 𝑚 yields 𝕆𝑖
𝑚 = {∅} and 
therefore there is no entry or exit. This sufficiently small 𝑚 is larger for EDs located in 
rural areas than for EDs in metropolitan areas. At the same time, the competition effect of 
the additional EDs included due to a larger 𝑚 is smaller. As a result, I expect differential 
effects of ED entry and exit, where EDs in located in rural areas have smaller effects for 
both reasons (less competition and smaller competition effects). I estimate (6) for 𝑚 from 
2 to 30 miles (the approximate 95th percentile of the distance to the closest ED).  
Figure 4 shows the average number of EDs in areas of radius of 2, 16, and 30 miles 
(values that correspond to the extremes and the midpoint of the distance distribution) 
around all EDs and metropolitan EDs. EDs located in urban areas have more neighbors 
than those in rural areas. When the area around an ED increases, the number of neighbors 
increases: the average number of neighbors is 0.39 at a 2-mile radius, 6.9 at a 16-mile 
radius, and 16 at a 30-mile radius. There is a slight decrease in number of neighbors over 
time at all radii and ED location, but the year-to-year variance is small. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 focus on entrants and exits in the surrounding areas of 
incumbent EDs. Figure 5 shows the percentage of EDs with an entrant or exit in its 




located in urban areas are more likely to have an entrant or exit in their surrounding area. 
EDs with entrants are more prevalent in earlier years than EDs with exits, but this situation 
is reversed in later years, indicating an increase in exits. Figure 6 reinforces this result: the 
average number of entrants per ED is higher than the number of exits in the first years of 
the sample, but exits exceed entrants in the latter years of the study period. These figures 
evidence that ED entries and exits are concentrated in metropolitan areas; for this reason, 
I’ll focus my results on all EDs and metropolitan EDs only. 
Table 2 through Table 5 show the results of estimating (6) using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) for all (Table 2 and Table 3) and metropolitan (Table 4 and Table 5) EDs 
and for different calculations of the area surrounding each ED. Following Error! 
Reference source not found., I select values of 𝑚 close to the median distance to the 
closest ED, by ED location.  Additionally, I add interactions to the measures of ED entrance 
and exit: miles between ED and the entrant or exiting ED, and the lagged volume of the 
exiting ED. If there are no entrant or exiting EDs, these interacting variables take the value 
of zero. The Mundlak test results favor fixed over random 𝜂𝑖, so I use a FE model to 
estimate (6). The multivariate model includes control variables for demand and cost shifters 
measured at the county level: population, population in poverty, median household income, 
population not insured, number of primary care physicians (PCP), and the number of 
physician assistants (PA).   
In general, OLS results show differential effects of entry and exit of EDs and 
competition on visits (Table 2). For the average ED, an additional entrant within a 2-mile 
radius decreases the contemporaneous number of visits of the incumbent ED by 2,951 




subsequent periods by 2,965 patients (𝛿3̂; 11.4% of mean number of visits). In the case of 
an additional ED exit in the same 2-mile radius area, the contemporaneous number of visits 
increases by 2,189 (𝛿2̂; 8.4% of mean number of visits), and in subsequent periods 
increases by 2,965 patients (−𝛿3̂). In models estimated with data from larger surrounding 
areas (i.e. with larger 𝑚), the contemporaneous effect becomes not statistically significant, 
and the subsequent effect remains significant and negative but is smaller in magnitude. 
Regardless of statistical significance, the effect of ED exit on the number of visits remains 
positive as the surrounding area increases, but the effect of ED entry changes from negative 
to positive; this unexpected result could be explained by the possible bias introduced by 
the endogeneity of ED entry. The interactions (Table 3) are not statistically significant in 
general due to low variation as the interacting variables are not defined for incumbent EDs 
without an entry or exit.  
The results for metropolitan EDs (Table 4) show statistically significant subsequent 
effects of ED entry and exit, but the contemporaneous effects are statistically significant 
only in small surrounding areas. An additional entrant within a 2-mile radius, on average, 
decreases the contemporaneous number of visits of the incumbent ED by 2,739 patients 
and decreases visits in subsequent periods by 2,669 patients. In the case of an additional 
ED exit in the same 2-mile radius area, the contemporaneous number of visits increases on 
average 2,249 visits, and in subsequent periods increases by 2,69 visits. The 
contemporaneous effect coefficients are not statistically significant at radii greater than 4 
miles. As with all EDs, the contemporaneous effect of ED entry is larger than of exit. The 





Table 6 and Table 7 show the results of estimating (6) with instrumental variables 
and generalized method of moments. I estimate these models using a generalized method 
of moments with fixed effects for EDs and clustered standard errors at the ED level. For 
the instrumental variable estimations to be valid, instruments should be relevant (strongly 
correlated with the endogenous variables) and excluded (uncorrelated with the dependent 
variable, conditional on the endogenous and exogenous variables). I run statistical tests to 
assess the relevance of the instruments; the exclusion restriction is empirically untestable, 
but an over-identification test in a model with more excluded instruments than endogenous 
variables sheds light over this assumption. Since the model has two endogenous variables 
(number of entrants and exits) and there are three excluded instrumental variables (the 
aggregate volume of the neighbors of the incumbent ED’s neighbors, the aggregate volume 
of the neighbors of the incumbent ED’s closed neighbors, and a land price index), I’m able 
to run over- and under-identification tests.  
 The tests of instrument validity in the first stage of the estimation support the 
hypothesis of valid instruments in all estimations. The Sandersons-Windmeijer F tests 
reject the joint hypothesis of the instruments not correlated with the endogenous variables 
in the two first-stage equations (Sanderson et al., 2016). The Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F 
statistic tests for weak identification with clustered standard errors, but there are no defined 
critical values to reject the hypothesis of weak identification (Kleibergen et al., 2006). The 
values of this F statistic are relatively large for the estimation of the model for all EDs. In 
a similar fashion, the under-identification test of the Kleinbergen-Paap rk chi-squared 
statistic rejects the under-identification hypothesis for all EDs. The non-rejection of the 




particular to the exclusion restriction assumption described before (Bhargava, 1991). 
Overall, the instruments are relevant and not weak. 
Table 6 shows the IV estimation results for all EDs. At 𝑚 = 10 miles, an additional 
ED entrant decreases the number of visits on average 6,058 visits contemporaneously and 
1,147 visits subsequently, while an ED exit increases the number of visits on average 784 
visits contemporaneously and 1,147 visits subsequently. Compared to the OLS results, the 
contemporaneous effects of entry and exit are mostly not statistically significant at all radii, 
but the subsequent effect is still statistically significant and negative. This result could 
indicate that consumers take time to adapt to changes in the accessibility of ED services. 
However, even if the coefficients of the concurrent effects are not statistically significant, 
they have the expected signs. The relevant IV coefficients are larger than those from the 
OLS regressions; this suggests that the OLS estimates are biased whereas the IV estimates 
are not, or that the IV estimates are local effects. In the estimates for EDs in metropolitan 
areas (Table 7), the statistical significance of the subsequent effects is also lost for some of 
the different surrounding areas. 
 
Discussion 
My results support the premise of geographical competition in emergency services. 
Entry or exit of EDs in the neighboring region of an incumbent ED change the number of 
visits in the incumbent ED. When ED entry or exit happen further away from the incumbent 
ED (operationalized in my models as a larger radius around the incumbent ED), the 




in urban areas; as very few ED entry and exit occur in rural areas, my results are not 
granular enough to support any hypothesis of geographic competition.  
Two main topics arise from the results of the estimation. First, the geographical 
competition effects are not symmetrical: ED entry is associated with larger decreases in 
visits at the incumbent ED than those associated with ED exits. This asymmetry could be 
a result of scale: closing firms tend to be smaller (Agarwal et al., 1996), so the number of 
visits diverted from the closed ED to the incumbent ED is relatively lower. At the same 
time, entering EDs can be small too. In my data, the number of visits of entering EDs is 
about 5.5 percent (1,423 patients on average) lower than incumbent EDs, and the number 
of visits of exiting EDs in the period before exit is about 6.1 percent (1,557 patients on 
average) lower than incumbent EDs. Second, changes in visits occur mostly in periods after 
ED entry or exit. The contemporaneous effects of entry and exit are statistically significant 
mostly in small surrounding areas, while subsequent effects are consistently statistically 
significant across specifications. These results may indicate path dependence in the 
emergency services market, where patients are slow to react to ED entry and exit due to 
previous decisions to use the incumbent EDs. Path dependence implies a learning behavior 
from patients, where other factors besides ED location are involved in the decision to use 
a particular ED. In the following Chapter I test whether these changes in emergency 
services availability are associated with health outcomes. 
The analysis in this chapter has several potential limitations. First, the data available 
do not have information of individual ED installed capacity or utilization. If hospitals 
invest to increase ED installed capacity, or if the level of ED utilization varies, and this 




installed capacity and utilization are characteristics that change gradually, most of this 
information would be captured by the ED fixed effects. A related limitation is the lack of 
data on individual patients instead of aggregate visits. With individual patient data, a more 
nuanced analysis of discrete choice is more informative about how patients decide to use 
emergency services when EDs enter or leave a market. Lastly, the study lacks an economic 
model of ED entry and exit that allows me relax some assumptions of the traditional Salop 
model (geographic and scale homogeneous firms). With such model I could simulate the 
effects of ED entry and exit on the number of visits by changing exogenous factors of entry 









Results from the previous chapter show that geographic competition in the 
emergency services exists, as a recently opened ED reduces the number of visits of 
incumbent EDs, and a recently closed ED increases the number of visits of incumbent EDs. 
However, this information is not sufficient to test induced demand. For instance, an ED 
closure increases visits at incumbent open EDs nearby. But perhaps some patients decide 
or are not able to seek care at nearby EDs; these patients are not captured in the results 
from equation (6). To test for induced demand, I make a prediction of market-aggregated 
visits gained or lost after changes in the availability of EDs. I use equation (6) from the 
previous chapter to estimate the counterfactual number of visits for incumbent EDs as if 
entry and exit of EDs had not happened. I also use equation (6) to estimate the 
counterfactual number of visits of closed EDs as if they were still open. The predicted 
change in visits due to entry and exit of EDs in market 𝐻 at the end of time period 𝑡 is 
given by  
  











𝐿𝐻𝑡 is the difference between the counterfactual volume of recently opened or closed EDs 
𝑉𝑗?̂? in market 𝐻 and the difference between the counterfactual volume of incumbent EDs 
with ED entry or exit in their vicinity 𝑉𝑖?̂?(𝑁𝑖𝑡) and the number of visits without any changes 
in competition 𝑉𝑖?̂?(𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁𝑖𝑡−1). The summation inside the squared brackets in (7) 
accounts for the aggregate change in visits in incumbent EDs due to entry and exit. The 
difference between this summation and the counterfactual volume of new or closed EDs 
indicates visits that were created by an entry or that disappeared from an exit; that is, the 
number of visits that was not diverted to or from incumbent EDs. 
 
Methods 
To test for induced demand, I estimate a Poisson regression at the market level with 
emergency-related health outcomes 𝑅𝐻𝑡 as dependent variables and 𝐿𝐻𝑡 as the main 
explanatory variables. The Poisson model with a dependent count variable 𝑅𝐻𝑡 has a 
conditional expectation given by: 
  
log(𝐸(𝑅𝐻𝑡|𝑍𝐻𝑡 , 𝐿𝐻𝑡 , 𝜉𝑡)) = 𝑍𝐻𝑡




Where 𝑍𝐻𝑡 are characteristics at the county level, 𝜉𝑡 are time fixed effects, and 𝜅𝐻 are fixed 
or random market effects distributed as a log gamma variable with mean 1 and variance 𝛼. 
The addition of the log of the population in hundred thousands (log 𝑃𝐻𝑡) and a restriction 




interpretable as changes in mortality rates per hundred thousand. The hypothesis  𝐻0: ?̂? =
0 states that the net change in visits is not correlated with changes in health outcomes and 
implies that this change is a result of demand induced by the availability of emergency 
services. 
There is evidence of race and sex disparities in access to emergency services 
(Hanchate et al., 2019; Parmar et al., 2018; Sarkar et al., 2020), so entry and exit of EDs 
could have differential effects on mortality rates by gender and race. In order to test if there 
are differential effects of changes of the availability of emergency services, I estimate 
equation (8) for mortality rates by sex (Male and Female) and race (White and Non-white). 
  
Results from volume aggregation 
I use the results from the OLS and IV models as inputs to equation (7) to predict 
the number of visits gained or lost due to ED entry and exit. For each new ED or closed 
ED, I use the estimates from (6) to compute an estimated number of visits and compare it 
to the change in estimated number of visits of the open EDs in the surrounding area. I 
aggregate the difference in visits at the county level; because county boundaries are 
arbitrary, visits from EDs located near these boundaries could be misallocated to a wrong 
county. This could bias the predicted results if there is a disproportionate number of EDs 
near county boundaries, but there is no plausible argument for such location bias. I 
calculate the predicted change in visits using the basic OLS estimates (Figure 7), the OLS 
estimates with interactions (Figure 8), and the IV estimates (Figure 9). It is worth noting 




subset of EDs, changes in visits based on these results will not reflect the changes for the 
whole population of EDs.  
 Figure 7 and Figure 8 show that ED entry creates more visits than the visits lost due 
to ED exit; between 2005 and 2013, ED entry created approximately 36 million ED visits 
(4.7 percent of total ED visits), and ED exit eliminated between 4 and 14 million ED visits 
(0.6-2.0 percent). The average number of patients gained per county-year is between 1,885 
and 2,123, and between 203 and 800 patients are lost. Consistent with the results tables 
described before, aggregations made with results from wider areas result in smaller 
aggregate visits; aggregations calculated with the results of the models with interactions 
are similar to the ones calculated from the models without interactions. These results imply 
that most patients reallocate to neighboring EDs after an ED exits, but an ED entry reduces 
the number of visits in the neighboring EDs and increases overall utilization. The results 
from the IV model (Figure 9) show negative predicted volumes in some years for radii 
greater than 6 miles: the number of visits of ED entrants was less that the total decrease in 
visits at incumbent EDs, and the counterfactual visits of closed EDs was less than the total 
increase in visits at incumbent EDs. Negative predicted volumes are expected given the 
large magnitude of the IV coefficients of (6) and the extrapolation of local estimates into 
predicted aggregated visits.  
 
Mortality rates results 
I estimate equation (8) using Poisson regressions, where 𝑅𝐻𝑡 is the number of 
deaths at time t in county H caused by conditions sensitive to emergency services, in three 




pulmonary heart disease, ICD-10-CM I30-I51 other forms of heart disease, and ICD-10 
I60-I69 cerebrovascular disease), accidental (ICD-10-CM V01-V99 transport accidents 
and ICD-10-CM W00-X59 other external causes of injuries), and respiratory related (ICD-
10-CM J40-J47 chronic lower respiratory diseases); of these conditions, I expect a stronger 
effect from the second group, as preventative care can influence cardiac and respiratory 
related mortality. 𝑍𝐻𝑡 are control variables that shift demand and cost for emergency 
services as described in the previous chapter. The coefficient of the log of the population 
(in hundred thousands) is restricted to 1, so that the estimated coefficients are changes in 
mortality rates per hundred thousand. Additionally, I include the total number of visits of 
emergency services to control for market size, and an indicator for when the number of 
deaths per county is small and the CDC considers the mortality rate as unreliable. I assumed 
𝜅𝐻 market effects are random, as information on mortality is available for a sample of 
counties. 
 Table 8 and Table 9 show the estimation of equation (8) for heart-related 
conditions, using the basic OLS and IV visits aggregation, respectively. Coefficients are 
reported in exponentiated form; a coefficient of 1.01 implies a 1 percent increase associated 
with a one unit increase in the corresponding variable, and the testable hypothesis of 
induced demand is  𝐻0̃: 𝑒
?̂? = 1. Results show a statistically significant correlation between 
visits lost and an increase in heart-related mortality rates. The results from the accident-
related mortality rates (Table 10 and Table 11) don’t show any statistically significant 
correlation between visits gained or lost and mortality, while the results from respiratory-
related conditions (Table 12 and Table 13) show a statistically significant relationship 




OLS model or the IV model doesn’t change the results with respect to mortality changes, 
except for heart-related conditions, where IV visit aggregates have a positive correlation 
with mortality. Results are consistent for different aggregation areas, except for the 
smallest area (m=2), where visits gained is positively corelated with increases in mortality 
rates for heart-related and respiratory-related conditions. In general, the statistically 
significant correlations are small: an increase in 1,000 patients lost is associated with an 
increase in heart-related mortality rates of between 0.03 and 0.06 percent. Some 
coefficients of the visits gained don’t have the expected direction, but the magnitude of the 
associations and the general lack of statistical significance do not contradict the expected 
results of the model. 
 Table 14 to Table 19 show the estimation of 𝜙1 and 𝜙2 from Equation (8) for male, 
female, white, and non-white mortality rates for heart-related conditions, accident-related 
deaths, and respiratory-related conditions, with OLS and IV visit aggregations. There is no 
solid evidence of differences in the correlations between changes in the number of visits 
and mortality by sex or race. 
 
Discussion 
The association between ED entry and exit and emergency-related mortality rates 
is ambiguous and varies by condition. First, some conditions are more sensitive to changes 
in visits due to ED entry or exit. Despite all conditions studied are sensitive to emergency 
services, mortality rates for heart- and respiratory-related conditions respond to changes to 
visits due to ED entry or exit, but mortality rates for accidents do not. While the first two 




transport accidents and severe external injuries are treated mostly in the ED. These results 
suggest that the demand-inducing hypothesis of ED entry and exit applies mostly to 
conditions that can only be treated in emergency departments. Second, despite some 
evidence of increases in mortality rates for heart-related conditions associated with the loss 
of visits due to ED exits, the small magnitude of this association puts in doubt the relevance 
of ED access to mortality. Overall mortality rates have declined at a yearly rate of about 1-
1.5 percent since the mid 20th century (Cutler et al., 2001), and early medical (sulfa drugs 
in Jayachandran et al., 2010) and public health interventions (clean water technologies in 
Cutler et al., 2005) have reduced mortality rates between 2 and 12.9 percentage points, 
respectively. Under this light, estimated increases in heart-related mortality rates of 0.02-
0.06 percent due to reductions in the number of visits are about one tenth of the decreases 
in mortality rates estimated for successful medical interventions. These results are in line 
with the literature on the subject, where ED closures are associated with worse health 
outcomes (Buchmueller et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2014). However, the lack 
of solid evidence regarding the association between increases in visits due to ED entry and 






CHAPTER 3. INPATIENT RISK SELECTION AND GEOGRAPHIC COMPETITION 
FROM FREESTANDING EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 
 
Analytical framework 
Increased competition in hospital markets, defined as more hospitals providing specialized 
services in a given market, is generally welfare-enhancing (Dranove et al., 1992; Kessler 
et al., 2000). However, when facing patients of different levels of acuity unknown ex-ante 
by the provider, certain reimbursement methods may provide incentives for hospitals to 
select patients by acuity level, and competition does not maximize social welfare. In 
particular, under a prospective payment system, where hospitals receive a fixed, 
predetermined amount per patient, hospitals have the incentive to cream (overprovide 
services to low acuity patients) and to skimp (underprovide services to high acuity patients) 
at the intensive margin (that is, on how much treatment to provide) (R P Ellis, 1998). These 
behaviors have equivalents at the extensive margin (that is, on which patients to treat), 
where providers prefer to treat low acuity patients, or to avoid high acuity patients. There 
is evidence that hospitals prefer low acuity patients, even if there is no consensus on 
whether low acuity patients are inherently more profitable (Friesner et al., 2009). Another 
instance where hospitals can select patients is through skimping low-income or 
uncompensated care patients. Uncompensated care costs in community hospitals accounted 
to US$38.4 billion dollars in 2017 (American Hospital Association, 2019), and an 
additional uncompensated patient costs hospitals approximately $800 per year (Garthwaite 




As cited in the introduction, previous studies show that FSEDs are located in more 
affluent areas. It is not clear if hospitals open FSEDs in affluent areas to attract 
advantageous patient types in the emergency care market or the inpatient care market. In 
the emergency care market, evidence shows that FSED entrance does not systematically 
change incumbent hospital-based EDs patient volume or quality of care (Xu et al., 2020). 
However, it is unclear whether FSEDs compete for admitted patients: I analyze whether 
hospitals with an FSED nearby have lower inpatient volume than hospitals that don’t have 
an FSED nearby, and if this volume is higher in hospitals that opened an FSED. I analyze 
creaming and skimping behavior of FSED entrance in incumbent hospitals by estimating 
the change in case and payer mix in hospitals that faced an FSED opening in their vicinity, 
and in hospitals that opened an FSED. If hospitals use FSEDs to compete for good patient 
types, creaming/skimping behavior on the extensive margin would show that, all else equal, 
hospitals with an FSED nearby have patient population with higher acuity and a higher 
proportion of low-income patients than hospitals without an FSED nearby. For hospitals 
that opened an FSED, this behavior would show a patient population with lower acuity and 
a lower proportion of low-income patients than those that didn’t open an FSED. On the 
other hand, hospitals may use FSEDs to seek high-risk patients that command higher 
reimbursements from the prospective payment system. As hospitals have more control over 
their own cost structure, higher reimbursement patients have the potential to become more 
profitable patients. Under this revenue-increasing hypothesis, hospitals with an FSED 
nearby have a patient population with a lower acuity than hospitals without an FSED 
nearby, and hospitals that opened an FSED have patient population with higher acuity than 






In addition to the NEDI-USA data described previously, in this chapter I use data on 
hospital case and payer mix from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
Acute Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). The IPPS program pays hospitals’ 
operating costs for Medicare Part A inpatient admissions based on prospective, flat rates. 
These rates are calculated by categorizing observed cases into groups of similar resource 
utilization level (Diagnosed-Related Groups, DRGs), and assigning a weight to each DRG 
based on the average resource utilization to treat patients within the corresponding DRG; 
rates are adjusted by hospital, based on cost of living, academic status of the hospital, the 
percent of uncompensated care patients, and the presence of unusually expensive patients.  
To calculate the base prospective inpatient rates to be applied in fiscal year 𝑡 + 1, 
CMS calculates measures of case mix and disproportionate share of low-income patients 
in fiscal year 𝑡 using Medicare Fee-For-Service administrative claims from fiscal year 𝑡 −
1; that is, the data published in the final rule IPPS impact files of fiscal year 2015 are 
matched with the NEDI-USA data of 2013. From these impact files, I use the number of 
cases adjusted for transfers (CASETA), a case mix index (CMI) and a transfer-adjusted 
case mix (TACMI), and the disproportionate share of low-income patients (DSHPT) per 
hospital. CASETA is a measure of admitted patients, where a higher number implies more 
inpatient cases. CMI and TACMI indices measure the level of acuity of the inpatient 
population at a hospital: a higher case mix index implies a patient population with higher 
acuity. Last, DSHPT is the sum of two components: inpatient days of Medicare patients in 




patients, and inpatient days of Medicaid-only patients as a percent of inpatient days from 
any payer. A higher DSHPT implies a higher low-income patient population.  
I link this information from the IPPS Impact files for Fiscal Years 2007-2015 with 
the NEDI-USA geographical data to identify FSED openings within 6 miles from an 
incumbent hospital. This is the distance on MedPAC’s recommendation for cuts in 
reimbursement rates for opening FSEDs. I check for robustness of the results with distances 
between 2 and 10 miles. I also link the data from the IPPS impact files and NEDI-USA 
data to identify which parent hospitals opened FSEDs. I use information from the 2005-
2013 Small Area Health Insurance Estimates and Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates programs from the US Census Bureau to obtain county-level population over 65 
years old, number of people in poverty, and median household income.  
 Table 20 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample used in this chapter. Of the 
distinct 3,970 hospitals in the IPPS data during the study period, 3,222 hospitals (81.2 
percent) have a match in the NEDI-USA data. Approximately 67 percent of all matched 
hospitals are located in metropolitan areas, while only about 13 percent are located in rural 
areas. The sample includes few Critical Access hospitals (7 in 2005 but none by 2013). The 
number of hospitals that operate at least one FSED increased 184 percent between 2005 
and 2013. In terms on characteristics of the area where FSEDs are located, much has been 
reported in the literature previously cited; it is not my intention to repeat or replicate those 
results, but to show the location of FSEDs as a mechanism to compete for inpatient 
admissions. About 75 percent of FSEDs are located in the same county as the parent 
hospital; if hospitals use FSEDs to compete for inpatient admissions or emergency care 




2013) and 3,564 (in 2005) transfer-adjusted inpatient admissions in the IPPS. Both the Case 
Mix and Transfer-Adjusted Case Mix indices have trended upward in the study period, but 
the disproportionate share percent increased from 2005 to 2009 and remained constant 
from 2011 to 2013.   
 
Methods  
Equation (9) presents the econometric model I use to estimate the effect on a hospital’s 
inpatient volume, case and payer mix of an FSED opening in the vicinity or a hospital 
opening an FSED.  
  
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛿𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑡




𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the volume, case mix or payer mix in hospital 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of hospital 
and county characteristics: number of beds in hospital, county population 65 years old and 
older, population with income under the Federal poverty line, and median household 
income. 𝜆𝑡 is a set of year fixed effects that capture underlying trends in patient acuity, and 
𝑖𝑡 is an error term that captures unobserved time-varying hospital characteristics that affect 
case or payer mix. As in previous chapters, I run Mundlak tests to determine if 𝛾𝑖 are fixed 
or random; these effects capture all information of observed and unobserved time-invariant 
hospital characteristics. The variables of interest are 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑚 as the number of FSEDs open 
within a 𝑚 miles radius around hospital 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 𝑂𝑖𝑡 as the number of FSEDs 




or payer mix between hospitals with an FSED within 𝑚 miles and hospitals without FSEDs 
within 𝑚 miles, and 𝜃 is the average difference in volume, case or payer mix between 
hospitals that operated one more FSED. When inpatient volume is the outcome of interest, 
a negative 𝛿𝑚 or a positive 𝜃 are evidence that FSEDs compete with incumbent hospitals 
for inpatient volume. A positive 𝛿𝑚 or a negative 𝜃 for the case mix and payer indices 
would support the hypothesis of creaming/skimping, while a negative 𝛿𝑚 or a positive 𝜃 
would support the revenue-enhancing hypothesis. 
FSED location or operating an FSED are not random: as described previously, the 
literature has found that hospitals locate FSED strategically in areas with higher expected 
revenue from more affluent, better insured patients. In a similar fashion, larger hospitals 
with better management are more likely to operate FSEDs (Patidar et al., 2017a). If so, 
OLS estimation of Equation (9) is biased because some unknown information in 𝑖𝑡 is 
correlated with the number of FSEDs in the vicinity or the likelihood of a hospital operating 
an FSED. I use an instrumental variable approach to correct for this potential bias. The first 
excluded instrument is the Land and Property Value price index calculated by the Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy (Davis & Palumbo, 2008; Davis et al., 2007), described in Chapter 
1. The identification assumption behind this instrument is that more expensive real estate 
increases the costs of opening an FSED but does not directly affect emergency care 
utilization, conditional on other observed time-variant characteristics and time and county 
fixed effects. I use the population-weighted land price index at time 𝑡 of the county where 
hospital 𝑖 is located and its neighboring counties, because most parent hospitals open their 
FSEDs in their county (67.9 – 76.5 percent). In addition, I include as instruments the 




of hospital-based EDs in the county and adjacent counties of the parent hospital. The 
identification assumption for these instruments is that a hospital is less likely to open an 
FSED in an area with more competition in emergency services, but that the increased 
competition of hospital-based EDs is not motivated by creaming or skimping. I estimate 
all instrumental variable models with a generalized method of moments. 
 
Results  
Figure 10 shows the percent of hospitals in the sample with an FSED within 2 to 
10 miles. By 2013, less than 1 percent of hospitals have an FSED within 2 miles, but about 
7 percent of hospitals have one within 10 miles. I expect a similar trade off as seen in 
Chapter 1, where a shorter radius has lower variability in the number of FSEDs but a closer 
FSED perhaps commands a stronger association with the model outcomes.  
Table 21 shows the results of the OLS estimation of Equation (9) with a radius 𝑚 =
6 miles, for hospitals in any location. As in Chapter 1, in all specifications the results from 
Mundlak tests favor a fixed 𝛾𝑖. To ease the interpretation of the changes in outcomes 
associated with the number of FSEDs in the vicinity or the number of FSEDs operated, I 
include the percent change (in italics) and the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent 
change of the outcome variable associated with the estimated coefficient. There are no 
statistically significant changes in the number of transfer-adjusted cases (CASETA) 
associated with the presence of FSEDs within 6 miles, but there are statistically significant 
decreases of 7.9 (95% CI -13.11 , -2.84 in all hospitals) and 6.4 (95% CI -10.68 , -2.06 in 
hospitals in metropolitan areas) percent associated with operating an FSED. There are 




(TACMI) associated with FSEDs: a hospital with an FSED within 6 miles has a CMI on 
average 1.763 percent  (95% CI 0.48 , 3.05) higher and a TACMI 1.780 percent (95% CI 
0.49 , 3.08) than a hospital without an FSED within 6 miles. These changes are slightly 
different in metropolitan hospitals (Table 22). The OLS results for payer mix contradict 
the hypothesis of creaming/skimping: another FSED within 6 miles is associated with a 
statistically significant decrease in the disproportionate share percent of 1.895 percent 
(95% CI -3.44 ; -0.35) of an average hospital, or 2.354 percent (95% CI -3.91 ; -0.80) of a 
metropolitan hospital. These results are robust to estimating Equation (9) with different 
radii (Table 23 and Table 24), except at radius 𝑚 = 2 miles. 
 The results of the instrumental variable estimation of Equation (9) are in Table 25 
(all hospitals) and Table 26 (metropolitan hospitals). These results consider the strategic 
decisions of hospitals to operate FSEDs and their location. The bottom of the table lists the 
tests of appropriateness of the instruments. The first stage tests for weak instruments 
(Sanderson-Windmeijer weak IV and Kleibergen-Paap under-identification tests) show a 
strong correlation between the instruments and the number of FSEDs nearby and the 
number of FSEDs operated in the first stage in all models. However, the Hansen J test of 
over-identifying restrictions rejects the hypothesis of the instruments being uncorrelated 
with the disproportionate share percent; this hypothesis is not rejected for the volume or 
the case mix outcomes.  
The instrumental variables models show a statistically significant decrease in 
volume of 30.7 percent associated with an additional FSED within 6 miles, but not an 
increase in hospitals that operate FSEDs. For the case mix indices, there is an increase of 




in TACMI associated with hospitals operating an additional FSED. There’s no statistically 
significant association between FSEDs within 6 miles and case mix. For areas of 8- and 
10- mile radius, where Figure 4 shows more FSEDs included in the vicinity, FSEDs are 
associated with reductions in CMI and TACMI of between 6.102 and 5.988 (10-mile 
radius) and 8.959 and 8.754 (8-mile radius) respectively (Table 27 and Table 28). As 
before, these results are similar for hospitals in metropolitan areas. Estimates for FSEDs 
within 2- and 4-mile radius show that the instruments are weak at explaining the number 
of FSEDs in the area in the first stage of the instrumental variable models.  
 The results of the payer mix models deserve special attention. The Hansen tests 
reject the hypothesis of valid instruments, so the IV estimates of 𝛿𝑚 and 𝜃 do not correctly 
consider the endogeneity of FSED location and operation. As an ad hoc analysis, I estimate 
𝛿𝑚 and 𝜃 separately using as instrument the land price index of the county where hospital 
𝑖 is located (for 𝛿𝑚) or the population-weighted land price index of the county and adjacent 
counties where hospital 𝑖 is located (for 𝜃). These models are exactly identified, because 
there is only one excluded instrument per endogenous variable; thus, it is not possible test 
the exclusion condition in the second stage. Table 29 and Table 30 shows these results. The 
instrument is strong for 6- to 10-mile radius areas, but, despite low p-values for the 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak Identification and Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification 
tests, not very strong for the number of FSEDs operated or 2- and 4-mile radius areas. 
There are strong and large increases in the disproportionate share percent associated with 
the number of FSEDs, from 78.23 to 131.2 percent in all hospitals, or from 51.67 to 85.41 




associated with operating FSEDs is large (91.27 percent), but only statistically significant 
at 90%. 
   
Discussion 
The rapid expansion of FSEDs in the last decade has been advertised as an 
opportunity to improve the provision of emergency services, alleviating overcrowded 
emergency rooms, and expanding access to emergency care (Baehr et al., 2020b; Harish et 
al., 2016). However, given that this expansion has occurred in geographical areas where 
there is no apparent need for more emergency care providers (A. J. Alexander et al., 2019; 
Dark et al., 2017; Patidar et al., 2016), FSEDs are not seen as benevolent by some. Evidence 
to date shows that FSEDs do not alleviate overcrowding in hospital-based EDs and are 
associated with increases in private and public health care expenditures (Ho et al., 2017, 
2019; Patidar et al., 2017b). Because EDs are a source of patients to a hospital (Morganti 
et al., 2013), FSEDs have the potential to attract patients from a different area where their 
parent hospitals are located. It is not clear if the strategic location of FSEDs attracts patients 
with less complex conditions. My results don’t fully support the hypothesis of hospitals 
using FSEDs to select lower acuity or higher income patients. While the estimates of simple 
associations show that hospitals with FSEDs nearby have a patient population of higher 
acuity than hospitals that don’t have an FSED nearby, estimates that correct for the 
endogeneous FSED location show the reverse: hospitals with an FSED nearby had lower 
case mix indices than hospitals without FSEDs nearby. The evidence for hospitals that 
opened FSEDs also contradicts the creaming/skimping hypothesis: these hospitals have 




These results favor the hypothesis of revenue maximization. The design of the IPPS 
assigns higher reimbursements to hospitals with higher case mix indices, and the program 
includes a provision for additional reimbursement for hospitals with a higher proportion of 
low-income patients. It is not clear whether hospitals that open FSEDs to obtain higher 
reimbursements from the IPPS via patients with higher acuity. It is beyond the scope of my 
study to evaluate whether the IPPS creates incentives for hospitals to prefer high-acuity 
patients instead of low-acuity patients.  
The evidence of FSEDs selecting better insured patients for their parent hospital is 
weak, because the main instrumental variable approach yields invalid instruments to 
answer this question. In the models where the excluded instrument is strong, the ad hoc 
analyses show large changes in payer mix in incumbent hospitals that support the 
creaming/skimping hypothesis. However, the model is exactly identified so I cannot test 
any over-identifying restriction. The reliability of the estimate depends exclusively on the 
assumption that the excluded instrument is correlated with payer mix only through the 
number of FSEDs in the area. More work is required in this area. 
There are also limitations to the analysis on this chapter. My results only consider 
Medicare Fee-for-Services inpatient admissions through the IPPS. Hospitals may use 
FSEDs to select low acuity patients from commercially insured patients, or from patients 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans. However, because Medicare patients account for 
most inpatient admissions from the ED (Morganti et al., 2013), and Medicare Fee-for-
Services account for about two thirds of all Medicare patients, using information of 
Medicare Fee-for-Services patients should provide a good picture of the effects of FSEDs 












In this dissertation I analyze geographic competition of EDs in the form of changes in 
availability of emergency services via entry and exit of EDs, and the expansion of FSEDs. 
Within this approach, I study two overarching topics: demand for emergency services 
induced by the availability of emergency services, and risk selection in inpatient 
admissions.  
On the first question, the results provide a limited support the hypothesis of induced 
demand. Whereas there is a sizeable association between visits lost and higher mortality 
rates for heart-relate conditions, ED entry and increases in the number of visits are not 
associated with decreases in mortality rates. My results support an asymmetric effect for 
ED entry and exit: ED exit reduces overall visits and increases certain subject-specific 
mortality rates, but ED entry is not associated with decreases in mortality rates. Moreover, 
ED entry and exit affect mortality rates for conditions that can be treated in places of service 
outside the ED, but don’t affect the mortality rates of conditions treated only in the ED, 
such as transport accidents and severe injuries. The implications of this asymmetry pose 
hard challenges for policy: policymakers need to identify which areas where EDs must be 
protected to prevent exits, but also place restrictions to ED entry in areas where new 
entrants are not needed. Market interventions like Certificate of Needs must consider this 
asymmetry. 
On the second question, my results support inpatient selection based on high-
revenue patients instead of selection based on low-acuity patients. Even when considering 




in hospitals without FSEDs nearby, and the case mix of hospitals that operated FSEDs is 
higher than those that did not operate FSEDs. A normative evaluation of these results is 
not straightforward, as the net change in resource utilization is unknown: unlike the 
analysis in the first two chapters of this dissertation where visits are fungible and net effects 
can be calculated, case mix indices are not fungible and the decrease in case mix index at 
incumbent hospitals cannot be aggregated and compared to the increase in case mix indices 
at parent hospitals. Current studies that compare Medicare resource utilization between 
areas with FSEDs and areas without FSEDs attempt this normative evaluation (Patidar et 
al., 2017b) and finds higher Medicare costs in counties with FSEDs than in counties 
without FSEDs. However, this study includes both emergency care and inpatient costs and 
doesn’t isolate the changes in expenditures from inpatient care.  
This dissertation has two main limitations, additional to the limitations discussed at 
the end of each chapter. First, it doesn’t address changes in access to EDs in rural areas; 
access to care in rural areas is a common and well-studied problem. In the first two 
chapters, the smaller scale and relative low numbers of rural EDs combined with the long 
distances between EDs and population center inherent to rural areas make the analysis of 
aggregate patient volumes underpowered, as shown by the small number of neighbors, 
entries and exits, and the insignificant effects of entry and exit. A more nuanced approach 
that connects detailed emergency services utilization with rural EDs is more appropriate to 
analyze the emergency services market in rural areas. In Chapter 3, as few FSEDs are 
located in rural areas also makes the analysis underpowered. Second, the instrumental 
variable approach is less efficient that alternative methods that control for endogeneity, and 




that have FSEDs nearby or decide to open FSEDs (in Chapter 3) are driven by changes in 
the instruments. As a result of this particular problem of instrumental variable estimation, 
the instrumental variable results are not generalizable to the population of EDs or hospitals. 
This is a well-known caveat of instrumental variables, but other mechanisms used with 
observational data to overcome selection biases and endogeneity (vg. natural experiments 
or regression discontinuity design) estimate results that are not generalizable either. 
However, the statistical tests performed to assess the quality of the instrumental variable 
approach show that the instruments satisfy the basic requirements of validity on all models 
in Chapters 1 and most models (except on the payer mix models, as discussed previously) 










This dissertation analyzes geographic competition of EDs and how it is related to health 
care utilization and health outcomes. In Chapter 1 I analyze how entry or exit of EDs 
changes the number of visits of incumbent EDs by diverting or attracting patients from the 
new or closed ED, and in Chapter 2 I analyze how these changes in visits are associated 
with changes in emergency-related mortality rates. Both questions try to answer whether 
the availability of EDs induces demand for emergency services. My results show 
differential effects of ED entry and exit: the decrease in visits at an incumbent ED resulting 
from increased competition through ED entry is higher than the increase in visits resulting 
from a decrease in competition through ED exit. Moreover, the effects of competition on 
the number of visits appear in the years following the ED entry and exit. These competition 
effects occur mostly in EDs located in metropolitan areas. When aggregated, the number 
of visits created by ED entry is more than twice the volume created by ED exits; this 
evidence points to a story where ED exits divert patients from closed EDs to incumbent 
EDs, but ED entry steals patients from incumbent EDs and increases the overall number of 
visits. However, these increases in visits due to ED entry are not correlated with decreases 
in emergency-related mortality rates; the volume of patients lost due to ED exits is 
correlated with small increases in heart-related mortality rates. These results support the 
hypothesis of induced demand for ED entry, but there is not enough evidence with regards 
to ED exit.  
Chapter 3 analyzes how geographic competition of FSEDs, a relatively new 




areas different from the main campus, is associated with the risk profile of inpatient 
admissions. I analyze how the presence of a FSED near an incumbent hospital or the 
operation of an FSED by a parent hospital is associated with case and payer mix indices 
from Medicare’s Acute Inpatient Prospective Payment System. My results show that 
hospitals with an additional FSED within 8 miles have case mix indices approximately 8 
percent lower than hospitals without an FSED nearby; this percent decreases as the area 
surrounding the incumbent hospital increases. Hospitals that operate an additional FSED 
have case mix indices between 22 and 24 percent higher than hospitals that did not operate 
an FSED. These results contradict the hypothesis that hospitals use FSEDs to select lower 
acuity patients, favoring revenue-maximizing behavior where hospitals that operate FSEDs 
seek higher acuity patients who command higher reimbursement rates. Evidence that 
hospitals use FSEDs to select higher income patients is weak, but it agrees with previous 





TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of hospital-based Emergency Departments and Freestanding Emergency Departments 
  2005 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013 
Number of hospital-based EDs 4,800 4,806 4,784 4,777 4,792 4,793 
  Metropolitan  2,781 2,792 2,774 2,771 2,789 2,898 
  Adjacent to metropolitan 1,144 1,141 1,139 1,138 1,134 1,071 
  Rural 875 873 871 868 869 824 
       
Number of FSEDs 69 86 127 161 182 202 
  Metropolitan  60 79 119 153 174 194 
  Adjacent to metropolitan 8 6 7 7 7 6 
  Rural 1 1 1 1 1 2 
       
Visits at hospital-based EDs (‘000) 113,566.5 118,027.7 123,719.7 130,510.8 132,953.4 135,525.0 
  Metropolitan  92,370.1 95,900.4 100,680.6 106,832.9 109,194.8 113,931.7 
  Adjacent to metropolitan 13,832.5 14,488.0 15,050.9 15,570.7 15,572.7 14,109.4 
  Rural 7,363.9 7,639.4 7,988.2 8,107.2 8,186.0 7,483.9 
       
Visits at FSEDs (‘000) 1,312.3 1,612.7 2,322.4 3,059.1 3,616.7 3,938.2 
  Metropolitan  1,239.2 1,542.1 2,238.9 2,972.9 3,499.2 3,839.7 
  Adjacent to metropolitan 73.15 69.97 82.81 85.48 116.06 94.07 
  Rural 0.01 0.68 0.71 0.68 1.41 4.5 




Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares estimates, All Emergency Departments. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Entrant (δ1) -2,951*** -437.1 128.2 460.0** 370.0** 
 (870.0) (438.0) (304.2) (223.5) (187.4) 
Exit (δ2) 2,189** 573.4 251.3 65.75 -22.59 
 (897.2) (351.2) (187.2) (159.8) (143.6) 
Lag N (δ3) -2,965*** -1,164*** -486.7*** -285.0** -211.0** 
 (879.5) (285.0) (170.6) (124.9) (92.12) 
All population (‘000) 4.273 6.212 5.425 5.488 5.747 
 (6.129) (5.993) (5.806) (5.796) (5.908) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 5.988 4.536 4.582 4.989 4.505 
 (4.183) (4.143) (4.045) (4.092) (4.154) 
Median household income (‘000) -121.3*** -124.8*** -129.3*** -130.0*** -130.6*** 
 (22.66) (22.70) (22.77) (22.82) (22.73) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) -13.92 -13.52 -10.85 -10.26 -9.591 
 (8.749) (8.802) (8.686) (8.657) (8.659) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 70.93*** 61.45*** 64.50*** 65.24*** 65.29*** 
 (22.25) (21.71) (20.55) (20.05) (20.81) 
Population not insured (‘000) 12.33** 11.30** 11.56** 11.57** 11.63** 
 (4.851) (4.836) (4.762) (4.781) (4.787) 
Constant 22,247*** 22,601*** 22,531*** 22,266*** 22,145*** 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
      
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Joint Mundlak Chi2 Stat. 368.93 354.53 312.76 280.2 276.03 
Joint Mundlak Chi2 Stat. p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Observations 29,578 29,578 29,578 29,578 29,578 
R-squared 0.105 0.105 0.104 0.104 0.104 
Number of EDs 5,209 5,209 5,209 5,209 5,209 
Fraction of within variance 0.951 0.953 0.952 0.953 0.953 
Corr(Z,𝜂) -0.494 -0.512 -0.504 -0.513 -0.523 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ED level. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary Care physicians. PA: Physician 
Assistant. 








Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares estimates with interactions, All Emergency Departments. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Entrant (δ1) -2,818 -2,712*** -387.0 -311.2 178.2 
 (1,832) (927.9) (593.6) (574.9) (395.4) 
Entrant x Miles from entrant -115.4 626.6** 82.75 88.16 17.85 
 (1,399) (265.6) (82.86) (60.43) (31.94) 
Exit (δ2) 1,935 1,190 443.9 553.3 631.5 
 (1,488) (829.7) (744.4) (498.1) (388.0) 
Exit x Miles from closure -166.5 -166.4 -5.796 -38.21 -38.76 
 (982.4) (194.9) (100.7) (54.15) (30.96) 
Exit x Volume closed 0.0166 -6.15e-05 -0.00216 -0.00203 -0.00289 
 (0.0356) (0.00592) (0.00334) (0.00194) (0.00178) 
Lag N (δ3) -2,987*** -1,200*** -487.2*** -280.2** -191.2** 
 (895.3) (279.5) (168.4) (124.8) (94.37) 
All population (‘000) 4.402 6.149 5.355 5.388 5.479 
 (6.139) (5.932) (5.733) (5.763) (5.869) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 5.905 4.597 4.658 5.066 4.813 
 (4.189) (4.091) (4.013) (4.024) (4.092) 
Median household income (‘000) -121.5*** -125.2*** -129.0*** -129.9*** -131.1*** 
 (22.65) (22.62) (22.77) (22.76) (22.67) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) -13.95 -13.61 -10.81 -10.55 -9.417 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Number of PAs (‘0) 70.52*** 60.44*** 64.65*** 65.21*** 64.51*** 
 (22.21) (21.50) (20.33) (19.86) (20.77) 
Population not insured (‘000) 12.22** 11.15** 11.48** 11.62** 11.82** 
 (4.787) (4.772) (4.729) (4.774) (4.783) 
Constant 22,250*** 22,802*** 22,576*** 22,294*** 22,032*** 
 (2,656) (2,635) (2,655) (2,643) (2,668) 
      
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 29,578 29,578 29,578 29,578 29,578 
R-squared 0.105 0.106 0.104 0.105 0.105 
Number of EDs 5,209 5,209 5,209 5,209 5,209 
Fraction of within variance 0.952 0.953 0.952 0.952 0.953 
Corr(Z,𝜂) -0.495 -0.505 -0.501 -0.509 -0.523 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ED level. Emergency Department. PCP: Primary Care physicians. PA: Physician 
Assistant. 






Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares estimates, Metropolitan Emergency Departments. 
  m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=10 
Entrant (δ1) -2,739*** -1,767*** -330.6 256.5 178.7 
 (908.7) (593.5) (445.6) (396.7) (307.1) 
Exit (δ2) 2,249** 1,505** 559.7 402.7 265.6 
 (965.1) (594.7) (353.2) (275.1) (187.1) 
Lag N (δ3) -2,669*** -1,966*** -962.8*** -626.3*** -406.8** 
 (936.9) (502.6) (288.0) (213.1) (171.2) 
All population (‘000) 0.202 2.545 1.517 1.386 0.845 
 (6.186) (6.054) (6.069) (6.010) (5.878) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.709 -1.000 -0.252 -0.268 -0.206 
 (4.223) (4.166) (4.178) (4.141) (4.072) 
Median household income (‘000) -118.0*** -123.6*** -124.2*** -129.6*** -131.3*** 
 (45.08) (44.95) (45.18) (45.23) (45.38) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) -20.52** -21.31** -20.18** -18.54** -17.94* 
 (9.253) (9.297) (9.295) (9.255) (9.175) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 34.90 27.13 28.35 30.03 30.81 
 (23.90) (22.90) (23.29) (22.88) (22.07) 
Population not insured (‘000) 13.33*** 12.63** 12.57** 12.65*** 12.82*** 
 (4.955) (4.947) (4.947) (4.899) (4.871) 
Constant 34,709*** 35,044*** 35,402*** 35,245*** 35,342*** 




  m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=10 
      
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Joint Mundlak Chi2 Stat. 82.85 84.64 72.94 62.62 55.16 
Joint Mundlak Chi2 Stat. p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Observations 16,083 16,083 16,083 16,083 16,083 
R-squared 0.132 0.133 0.131 0.131 0.130 
Number of EDs 2,920 2,920 2,920 2,920 2,920 
Fraction of within variance 0.921 0.927 0.922 0.923 0.921 
Corr(Z,𝜂) -0.400 -0.474 -0.419 -0.427 -0.405 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ED level. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary Care physicians. PA: Physician 
Assistant. 







Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares estimates with interactions, Metropolitan Emergency Departments. 
  m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=10 
Entrant (δ1) -2,426 -2,963** -2,532*** -1,552** -330.4 
 (1,904) (1,234) (951.9) (732.5) (605.6) 
Entrant x Miles from entrant -264.2 524.9 600.3** 359.4** 81.22 
 (1,432) (510.0) (270.0) (157.7) (83.78) 
Exit (δ2) 2,299 1,324 1,376 755.2 664.7 
 (1,647) (1,205) (871.4) (718.9) (777.3) 
Exit x Miles from closure -396.6 35.43 -215.9 -81.92 -33.47 
 (1,075) (450.1) (202.0) (121.4) (104.9) 
Exit x Volume closed 0.0146 0.00197 -0.000391 0.000851 -0.00275 
 (0.0358) (0.0117) (0.00592) (0.00418) (0.00337) 
Lag N (δ3) -2,683*** -1,963*** -1,001*** -652.0*** -406.0** 
 (956.1) (494.1) (282.3) (210.4) (169.0) 
All population (‘000) 0.304 2.538 1.483 1.388 0.840 
 (6.190) (5.928) (6.007) (5.906) (5.797) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.634 -0.924 -0.222 -0.523 -0.179 
 (4.228) (4.072) (4.122) (4.076) (4.039) 
Median household income (‘000) -118.2*** -124.5*** -125.7*** -131.3*** -131.1*** 
 (45.07) (44.95) (44.98) (45.13) (45.37) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) -20.62** -21.30** -20.22** -18.21** -17.94* 




  m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=10 
Number of PAs (‘0) 34.63 26.80 27.23 28.73 30.82 
 (23.85) (22.85) (23.10) (22.65) (21.83) 
Population not insured (‘000) 13.25*** 12.63*** 12.43** 12.37** 12.71*** 
 (4.887) (4.801) (4.887) (4.835) (4.838) 
Constant 34,720*** 35,088*** 35,766*** 35,662*** 35,406*** 
 (4,835) (4,823) (4,798) (4,792) (4,844) 
      
Time fixed effects Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Observations 16,083 16,083 16,083 16,083 16,083 
R-squared 0.132 0.133 0.132 0.132 0.131 
Number of EDs 2,920 2,920 2,920 2,920 2,920 
Fraction of within variance 0.921 0.927 0.922 0.922 0.921 
Corr(Z,𝜂) -0.401 -0.474 -0.413 -0.419 -0.401 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ED level. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary Care physicians. PA: Physician 
Assistant. 






Table 6. Instrumental Variables estimates, All Emergency Departments. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Entrant (δ1) -9,282 -6,044 -6,058* -3,004** -804.6 
 (12,051) (5,315) (3,106) (1,526) (954.1) 
Exit (δ2) 27.04 2,203** 784.3* 412.6 12.56 
 (2,880) (1,111) (440.2) (309.0) (270.6) 
Lag N (δ3) -3,572 -2,344** -1,147*** -654.9*** -311.5** 
 (3,269) (932.6) (373.4) (210.0) (137.8) 
All population (‘000) 4.909 10.77 10.79 11.07* 7.859 
 (7.636) (7.622) (6.856) (6.525) (6.242) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 5.078 -1.245 -6.204 -5.110 0.169 
 (5.240) (7.129) (7.262) (6.315) (5.561) 
Median household income (‘000) -121.0*** -126.2*** -134.5*** -135.3*** -135.1*** 
 (22.36) (22.53) (22.76) (23.00) (23.14) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) -16.04* -14.36 -11.62 -9.114 -10.50 
 (8.917) (8.848) (8.786) (8.669) (8.547) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 65.42** 41.94 35.42 39.22 56.70** 
 (30.44) (29.74) (25.84) (23.90) (22.75) 
Population not insured (‘000) 11.43** 9.092* 9.620* 8.871* 10.81** 
 (5.362) (5.307) (5.009) (4.976) (4.840) 
      




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Observations 29,476 29,476 29,476 29,476 29,476 
R-squared 0.097 0.083 0.040 0.067 0.098 
Number of EDs 5,107 5,107 5,107 5,107 5,107 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Entrant F stat. 14.53 28.18 22.96 90.53 90.58 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Entrant p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Exit F stat. 31.20 51.85 239.8 306.4 221.7 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Exit p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sargan-Hansen Over-identification Stat. 0.0886 0.318 0.0861 0.150 0.0935 
Sargan-Hansen Over-identification p-value 0.766 0.573 0.769 0.698 0.760 
Kleibergen-Paap Weak Identification Stat. 9.144 17.93 15.31 54.64 50.98 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak Inst. Inference Stat. 2.717 5.582 5.058 4.795 0.885 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak Inst. Inference p-value 0.437 0.134 0.168 0.187 0.829 
Anderson-Rubin Weak Inst. Inference Stat. 2.655 5.220 4.121 4.363 0.829 
Anderson-Rubin Weak Inst. Inference p-value 0.448 0.156 0.249 0.225 0.842 
Kleibergen-Paap Under-identification Stat. 22.60 37.04 52.07 91.85 106.6 
Kleibergen-Paap Under-identification p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ED level. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary Care physicians. PA: Physician 
Assistant. 






Table 7. Instrumental Variables estimates, Metropolitan Emergency Departments. 
  m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=10 
Entrant (δ1) 206.9 -15,786** -2,325 -365.1 -3,438 
 (11,685) (7,179) (5,116) (4,714) (3,052) 
Exit (δ2) -1,897 4,608** 1,446 -191.4 414.4 
 (2,870) (2,229) (1,069) (954.6) (428.9) 
Lag N (δ3) -840.3 -5,194*** -1,501* -540.8 -761.5** 
 (3,293) (1,754) (895.6) (784.2) (361.9) 
All population (‘000) -2.418 10.40 3.371 1.115 3.896 
 (7.859) (7.160) (7.685) (8.068) (6.882) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 2.007 -9.590 -2.399 -1.018 -6.772 
 (5.211) (6.004) (6.985) (8.303) (7.282) 
Median household income (‘000) -105.9** -126.3*** -120.4*** -117.2*** -128.7*** 
 (44.57) (44.37) (44.25) (44.47) (44.35) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) -21.03** -25.43*** -21.22** -20.04** -18.66** 
 (9.357) (9.725) (9.271) (9.303) (9.272) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 42.38 -6.433 21.77 28.82 13.94 
 (31.94) (23.50) (31.26) (28.42) (27.12) 
Population not insured (‘000) 13.44** 8.459 11.45** 12.08** 11.35** 
 (5.435) (5.453) (5.411) (5.224) (5.051) 
      




  m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=10 
Observations 15,995 15,995 15,995 15,995 15,995 
R-squared 0.128 0.066 0.128 0.130 0.108 
Number of EDs 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Entrant F stat. 14.23 19.83 27.42 14.20 22.51 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Entrant p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Exit F stat. 30.74 74.72 50.41 92.29 239.4 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Exit p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sargan-Hansen Over-identification Stat. 1.325 1.037 1.398 1.365 1.310 
Sargan-Hansen Over-identification p-value 0.250 0.308 0.237 0.243 0.252 
Kleibergen-Paap Weak Identification Stat. 9.032 12.99 17.44 9.462 15.02 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak Inst. Inference Stat. 3.406 8.873 4.413 1.856 3.008 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak Inst. Inference p-value 0.333 0.0310 0.220 0.603 0.390 
Anderson-Rubin Weak Inst. Inference Stat. 3.142 7.380 4.181 1.697 2.623 
Anderson-Rubin Weak Inst. Inference p-value 0.370 0.0607 0.243 0.638 0.453 
Kleibergen-Paap Under-identification Stat. 22.59 31.42 36.61 25.91 51.09 
Kleibergen-Paap Under-identification p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ED level. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary Care physicians. PA: Physician 
Assistant. 







Table 8. Poisson regressions of mortality rates, Heart-related conditions – aggregation from Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004*** 0.9999 1.0000 1.0001 1.0001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9996 1.0006*** 1.0004*** 1.0003*** 1.0003*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unreliable rate  0.7705*** 0.7729*** 0.7717*** 0.7718*** 0.7719*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
All visits (‘000) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.9998** 0.9996*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Median household income (‘000) 0.9943*** 0.9938*** 0.9943*** 0.9944*** 0.9943*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) 0.9999 1.0001 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 0.9988*** 0.9989** 0.9990* 0.9990** 0.9990** 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Population not insured (‘000) 0.9998*** 0.9999*** 0.9999*** 0.9999*** 0.9999*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
 . . . . . 
Constant 425.69*** 432.14*** 424.31*** 424.05*** 424.18*** 
 (14.78) (13.82) (12.91) (13.08) (13.19) 
α 0.0857*** 0.0843*** 0.0856*** 0.0856*** 0.0856*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0177) 
           
Mean mortality rate 300.36 300.36 300.36 300.36 300.36 
Aggregation estimates Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 17,646 17,646 17,646 17,646 17,646 
Number of counties 3,021 3,021 3,021 3,021 3,021 
Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random effects. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary 
Care physicians. PA: Physician Assistant. Heart-related: ischemic heart disease (ICD 10-CM I20-I25), pulmonary heart disease (ICD-
10 I26-I28), other forms of heart disease (ICD-10 I30-I51), and cerebrovascular disease (ICD 10-CM I60-I69). 






Table 9. Poisson regressions of mortality rates, Heart-related conditions – aggregation from Instrumental Variables results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0003** 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9998 1.0003*** 1.0001** 1.0001** 1.0002*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Unreliable rate  0.7712*** 0.7718*** 0.7722*** 0.7720*** 0.7721*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0130) 
All volume (‘000) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.9998** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9998*** 0.9997*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Median household income (‘000) 0.9942*** 0.9943*** 0.9943*** 0.9944*** 0.9943*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 0.9987*** 0.9993 0.9991* 0.9990* 0.9989** 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Population not insured (‘000) 0.9999** 0.9998*** 0.9999*** 0.9999*** 0.9999*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log all population (‘000,000) 1 1 1 1 1 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Constant 427.22*** 426.05*** 423.40*** 422.70*** 423.52*** 
 (14.90) (13.15) (12.60) (12.81) (12.92) 
α 0.0852*** 0.0853*** 0.0857*** 0.0858*** 0.0856*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
           
Mean mortality rate 300.36 300.36 300.36 300.36 300.36 
Aggregation estimates IV IV IV IV IV 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 17,646 17,646 17,646 17,646 17,646 
Number of counties 3,021 3,021 3,021 3,021 3,021 
Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random effects. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary 
Care physicians. PA: Physician Assistant. Heart-related: ischemic heart disease (ICD 10-CM I20-I25), pulmonary heart disease (ICD-
10 I26-I28), other forms of heart disease (ICD-10 I30-I51), and cerebrovascular disease (ICD 10-CM I60-I69). 







Table 10. Poisson regressions of mortality rates, Accident-related deaths – aggregation from Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Visits gained (ϕ1) 0.9999 0.9998 1.0001 1.0001 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) 0.9995 1.0000 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unreliable rate  0.7715*** 0.7720*** 0.7716*** 0.7718*** 0.7718*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0193) 
All visits (‘000) 1.0000 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.9994** 0.9993*** 0.9992*** 0.9993*** 0.9993*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Median household income (‘000) 0.9892*** 0.9889*** 0.9890*** 0.9890*** 0.9890*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) 1.0002 1.0003 1.0003 1.0002 1.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 1.0005 1.0002 1.0000 1.0001 1.0001 
 (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Population not insured (‘000) 0.9997** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log all population (‘000,000) 1 1 1 1 1 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Constant 98.83*** 99.92*** 99.69*** 99.74*** 99.80*** 
 (5.51) (5.12) (5.32) (5.26) (5.23) 
α 0.1060*** 0.1050*** 0.1053*** 0.1052*** 0.1052*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0314) (0.0330) (0.0323) (0.0321) 
           
Mean mortality rate 55.26 55.26 55.26 55.26 55.26 
Aggregation estimates Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,901 11,901 11,901 11,901 11,901 
Number of counties 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 
Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random effects. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary 
Care physicians. PA: Physician Assistant. Accident related: transport accidents (ICD-10-CM V01-V99) and other external causes of 
injuries (ICD-10-CM W00-X59). 







Table 11. Poisson regressions of mortality rates, Accident-related deaths – aggregation from Instrumental Variables results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Visits gained (ϕ1) 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) 0.9996 1.0001 1.0000* 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Unreliable rate  0.7716*** 0.7715*** 0.7715*** 0.7715*** 0.7715*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0198) 
All visits (‘000) 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.9994** 0.9993*** 0.9993*** 0.9993*** 0.9993*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Median household income (‘000) 0.9892*** 0.9890*** 0.9891*** 0.9891*** 0.9890*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) 1.0002 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 1.0005 1.0001 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Population not insured (‘000) 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log all population (‘000,000) 1 1 1 1 1 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Constant 98.90*** 99.64*** 99.46*** 99.51*** 99.68*** 
 (5.42) (5.29) (5.30) (5.34) (5.33) 
α 0.1060*** 0.1052*** 0.1053*** 0.1053*** 0.1052*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0328) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0332) 
           
Mean mortality rate 55.26 55.26 55.26 55.26 55.26 
Aggregation estimates IV IV IV IV IV 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,901 11,901 11,901 11,901 11,901 
Number of counties 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 
Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random effects. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary 
Care physicians. PA: Physician Assistant. Accident related: transport accidents (ICD-10-CM V01-V99) and other external causes of 
injuries (ICD-10-CM W00-X59). 






Table 12. Poisson regressions of mortality rates, Respiratory-related conditions – aggregation from Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004* 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999** 0.9999*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0001 1.0003 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unreliable rate  0.7522*** 0.7529*** 0.7528*** 0.7526*** 0.7525*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0159) 
All visits (‘000) 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.9996*** 0.9996*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Median household income (‘000) 0.9856*** 0.9855*** 0.9857*** 0.9856*** 0.9857*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) 1.0000 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 0.9990** 0.9994 0.9995 0.9994 0.9993 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Population not insured (‘000) 0.9998*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log all population (‘000,000) 1 1 1 1 1 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Constant 133.44*** 133.41*** 132.77*** 132.83*** 132.74*** 
 (4.82) (4.63) (4.73) (4.74) (4.78) 
α 0.1119*** 0.1118*** 0.1121*** 0.1122*** 0.1123*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0337) (0.0340) (0.0346) (0.0350) 
           
Mean mortality rate 65.70 65.70 65.70 65.70 65.70 
Aggregation estimates Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 12,518 12,518 12,518 12,518 12,518 
Number of counties 2,470 2,470 2,470 2,470 2,470 
Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random effects. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary 
Care physicians. PA: Physician Assistant. Respiratory-related: chronic lower respiratory disease (ICD 10-CM J40-J47). 






Table 13. Poisson regressions of mortality rates, Respiratory-related conditions – aggregation from Instrumental Variables results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0003** 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000* 0.9999*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0002 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Unreliable rate  0.7524*** 0.7528*** 0.7526*** 0.7524*** 0.7520*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0161) 
All visits (‘000) 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Population in poverty (‘000) 0.9996*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9998*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Median household income (‘000) 0.9855*** 0.9857*** 0.9857*** 0.9857*** 0.9857*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Number of PCPs (‘0) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Number of PAs (‘0) 0.9991* 0.9994 0.9993 0.9993 0.9991* 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Population not insured (‘000) 0.9998*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log all population (‘000,000) 1 1 1 1 1 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Constant 133.54*** 132.86*** 132.77*** 132.80*** 132.68*** 
 (4.75) (4.73) (4.76) (4.80) (4.91) 
α 0.1117*** 0.1121*** 0.1121*** 0.1121*** 0.1123*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0345) (0.0357) 
           
Mean mortality rate 65.70 65.70 65.70 65.70 65.70 
Aggregation estimates IV IV IV IV IV 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 12,518 12,518 12,518 12,518 12,518 
Number of counties 2,470 2,470 2,470 2,470 2,470 
Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random effects. ED: Emergency Department. PCP: Primary 
Care physicians. PA: Physician Assistant. Respiratory-related: chronic lower respiratory disease (ICD 10-CM J40-J47). 







Table 14 Disparities in mortality rates, Heart-related deaths – aggregation from Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Male (N=16,291)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004*** 0.9999 1.0000 1.0001 1.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9998 1.0007*** 1.0004*** 1.0003*** 1.0002*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female (N=16,180)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004** 0.9999 1.0000 1.0001 1.0001* 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9997 1.0006*** 1.0004** 1.0003** 1.0002*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
White (N=17,495)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0005*** 1.0000 1.0001 1.0001* 1.0001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9995 1.0007*** 1.0005** 1.0004*** 1.0003*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Non-White (N=5,951)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0005** 1.0001 1.0002** 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9996 1.0004** 1.0002** 1.0001** 1.0001** 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
           
Aggregation estimates Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Each pair of rows correspond to a Poisson regression. Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random 
effects. Heart-related: ischemic heart disease (ICD 10-CM I20-I25), pulmonary heart disease (ICD-10 I26-I28), other forms of heart 
disease (ICD-10 I30-I51), and cerebrovascular disease (ICD 10-CM I60-I69). 






Table 15. Disparities in mortality rates, Heart-related deaths – aggregation from Instrumental Variables results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Male (N=16,291)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0003*** 1.0001* 1.0000* 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9999 1.0003*** 1.0001** 1.0001** 1.0001*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Female (N=16,180)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0003** 1.0001* 1.0000* 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9998 1.0003** 1.0001** 1.0001** 1.0002** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
White (N=17,495)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004*** 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001* 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9997 1.0004** 1.0002** 1.0001** 1.0002*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Non-White (N=5,951)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0003* 1.0001*** 1.0000*** 1.0000** 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9998 1.0002*** 1.0001*** 1.0001** 1.0001** 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
           
Aggregation estimates IV IV IV IV IV 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Each pair of rows correspond to a Poisson regression. Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random 
effects. Heart-related: ischemic heart disease (ICD 10-CM I20-I25), pulmonary heart disease (ICD-10 I26-I28), other forms of heart 
disease (ICD-10 I30-I51), and cerebrovascular disease (ICD 10-CM I60-I69). 







Table 16. Disparities in mortality rates, Accident-related deaths – aggregation from Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Male (N=16,291)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0000 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 
 (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female (N=16,180)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0000 0.9998 1.0002 1.0001 1.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9989 1.0000 1.0002 1.0001 1.0001 
 (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
White (N=17,495)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 0.9998 0.9999 1.0002 1.0001** 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0002 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Non-White (N=5,951)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0009*** 0.9999 0.9994 0.9998 0.9999 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9979* 0.9999 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
           
Aggregation estimates Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Each pair of rows correspond to a Poisson regression. Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random 
effects. Accident related: transport accidents (ICD-10-CM V01-V99) and other external causes of injuries (ICD-10-CM W00-X59). 






Table 17. Disparities in mortality rates, Accident-related deaths – aggregation from Instrumental Variables results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Male (N=16,291)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000** 0.9999** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999* 
 (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Female (N=16,180)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9991 1.0002* 1.0001** 1.0001** 1.0001 
 (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
White (N=17,495)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 0.9998* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0002 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Non-White (N=5,951)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004** 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999* 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9983 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0000 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
           
Aggregation estimates IV IV IV IV IV 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Each pair of rows correspond to a Poisson regression. Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random 
effects. Accident related: transport accidents (ICD-10-CM V01-V99) and other external causes of injuries (ICD-10-CM W00-X59). 







Table 18. Disparities in mortality rates, Respiratory-related conditions – aggregation from Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Male (N=16,291)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0005* 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999** 0.9999** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0002 1.0003 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female (N=16,180)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004** 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999*** 0.9999*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0003 1.0003 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
White (N=17,495)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0005** 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0001 1.0004* 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Non-White (N=5,951)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0002 1.0002 0.9994** 0.9997*** 0.9998*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 0.9998 0.9999 0.9998** 0.9998*** 0.9998** 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
           
Aggregation estimates Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Each pair of rows correspond to a Poisson regression. Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random 
effects. Respiratory-related: chronic lower respiratory disease (ICD 10-CM J40-J47). 





Table 19. Disparities in mortality rates, Respiratory-related conditions – aggregation from Instrumental Variables results. 
  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
Male (N=16,291)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004** 0.9999 1.0000** 1.0000** 0.9999** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0003 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Female (N=16,180)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0003* 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000* 0.9999*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0003 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
White (N=17,495)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0004** 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000* 0.9999** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0001 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Non-White (N=5,951)      
Visits gained (ϕ1) (‘000) 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000** 0.9999*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Visits lost (ϕ2) (‘000) 1.0001 0.9999 0.9999* 0.9999** 0.9999** 




  m=2 m=6 m=10 m=14 m=18 
           
Aggregation estimates IV IV IV IV IV 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Each pair of rows correspond to a Poisson regression. Incidence Rate Ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. County random 
effects. Respiratory-related: chronic lower respiratory disease (ICD 10-CM J40-J47). 






Table 20. Descriptive statistics, hospitals in Acute Inpatient Prospective Payment System and NEDI-USA 
  2005 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013 
Hospitals in IPPS1 3,051 3,093 3,107 3,114 3,086 3,033 
  Metropolitan  2,033 2,069 2,078 2,085 2,074 2,044 
  Adjacent to metropolitan 597 601 604 607 597 583 
  Rural 421 423 425 422 415 406 
       
  Academic  110 111 139 139 146 173 
  Critical Access 7 4 1 0 0 0 
       
  Parent to FSED 51 66 91 113 131 145 
  Parent and FSED in same county 39 48 62 77 89 99 
       
Case mix measures       
  Transfer-adjusted Cases 3,564.20 3,412.95 3,261.84 3,235.76 3,127.42 3,079.09 
  Case Mix Index 1.3707 1.3757 1.44 1.457 1.4757 1.5043 
  Transfer-Adjusted Case Mix Index 1.3586 1.3632 1.4274 1.4448 1.4638 1.4926 
       
Payer mix measures       
  Disproportionate Share percent 26.94% 27.37% 27.84% 29.00% 29.00% 28.98% 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services IPPS Final Rules 2007-2015 and NEDI-USA 2005-2013. 1 81.2 percent of 
hospitals in IPPS had a match in NEDI-USA data. ED: Emergency Department. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. IPPS: 






Table 21. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 6-mile radius, all hospitals – Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
 
CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of FSEDs in area -44.75 0.0256*** 0.0257*** -0.00542**  
(40.82) (0.00953) (0.00951) (0.00226)  
-1.375 1.763 1.787 -1.895  
[-3.83 ; 1.08] [0.48 ; 3.05] [0.49 ; 3.08] [-3.44 ; -0.35] 
Number of FSEDs operated -259.5*** -0.00926* -0.00919* 0.00444 
 (85.32) (0.00561) (0.00551) (0.00312) 
 -7.974 -0.638 -0.638 1.551 
 [-13.11 ; -2.84] [-1.40 ; 0.12] [-1.40 ; 0.11] [-0.59 ; 3.69] 
Population over 65 years old 0.118 0.000304*** 0.000314*** 0.000218***  
(0.362) (6.82e-05) (6.66e-05) (4.26e-05) 
Median household income 14.64*** 0.00102** 0.00104** 3.87e-05  
(2.437) (0.000412) (0.000408) (0.000229) 
Number of beds 6.477*** 8.05e-05* 8.68e-05** 4.30e-05*  
(0.489) (4.16e-05) (4.12e-05) (2.29e-05) 
Population in poverty 0.546*** 0.000107*** 0.000110*** -8.87e-05***  
(0.147) (3.00e-05) (2.95e-05) (1.76e-05) 
Constant 1,604*** 1.275*** 1.259*** 0.246***  
(145.5) (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0119)  
        
Radius (miles) 6 6 6 6 




Area All All All All 
Observations  21,367   21,367   21,367   21,367  
R-squared  0.255   0.330   0.339   0.102  
Number of hospitals 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 
Fraction of within variance 0.950 0.908 0.909 0.928 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 






Table 22. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 6-mile radius, metropolitan hospitals – Ordinary Least Squares results. 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
 
CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of FSEDs in area -37.29 0.0238** 0.0239** -0.00680***  
(40.95) (0.00949) (0.00947) (0.00229)  
-0.923 1.535 1.555 -2.354  
[-2.91 ; 1.06] [0.34 ; 2.73] [0.35 ; 2.76] [-3.91 ; -0.80] 
Number of FSEDs operated -257.3*** -0.0119** -0.0119** 0.00324 
 (88.93) (0.00589) (0.00579) (0.00318) 
 -6.369 -0.767 -0.771 1.123 
 [-10.68 ; -2.06] [-1.51 ; -0.02] [-1.51 ; -0.03] [-1.04 ; 3.29] 
Population over 65 years old 0.561 0.000192*** 0.000199*** 0.000143***  
(0.392) (7.04e-05) (6.86e-05) (4.46e-05) 
Median household income 20.45*** 0.00134** 0.00136*** -0.000292  
(3.389) (0.000522) (0.000518) (0.000275) 
Number of beds 6.866*** 5.57e-05 6.14e-05 3.06e-05  
(0.509) (4.53e-05) (4.50e-05) (2.46e-05) 
Population in poverty 0.614*** 0.000116*** 0.000118*** -8.80e-05***  
(0.156) (3.08e-05) (3.01e-05) (1.78e-05) 
Constant 1,548*** 1.338*** 1.321*** 0.268***  
(214.4) (0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0161)  
        
Radius (miles) 6 6 6 6 




Area Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan 
Observations  14,316   14,316   14,316   14,316  
R-squared  0.243   0.338   0.347   0.150  
Number of hospitals 2,137 2,137 2,137 2,137 
Fraction of within variance 0.947 0.892 0.894 0.949 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 






Table 23. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 2 to 10-mile radius, All hospitals – Ordinary Least Squares results. 
 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
  CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 











Number of FSEDs in area -129.9 0.00197 0.00146 -0.00456 
 (109.3) (0.0220) (0.0218) (0.00542) 
 -3.991 0.135 0.101 -1.594 
 [-10.57 ; 2.59] [-2.83 ; 3.10] [-2.87 ; 3.07] [-5.31 ; 2.12] 
Number of FSEDs operated -259.1*** -0.00909 -0.00902 0.00442 
 (85.41) (0.00561) (0.00551) (0.00312) 
 -7.962 -0.626 -0.626 1.547 











Number of FSEDs in area -91.89 0.0302* 0.0307** -0.00646** 
 (60.68) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.00329) 
 -2.824 2.083 2.131 -2.259 
 [-6.48 ; 0.83] [-0.01 ; 4.18] [0.02 ; 4.24] [-4.51 ; -0.00] 
Number of FSEDs operated -259.0*** -0.00935* -0.00929* 0.00446 
 (85.36) (0.00561) (0.00552) (0.00312) 
 -7.959 -0.644 -0.645 1.558 












Number of FSEDs in area -20.46 0.0227*** 0.0230*** -0.00524*** 
 (27.87) (0.00649) (0.00626) (0.00173) 
 -0.629 1.562 1.598 -1.833 
 [-2.31 ; 1.05] [0.69 ; 2.44] [0.75 ; 2.45] [-3.02 ; -0.65] 




 (85.38) (0.00556) (0.00547) (0.00312) 
 -7.967 -0.666 -0.668 1.586 












Number of FSEDs in area -27.60 0.0156*** 0.0158*** -0.00429*** 
 (22.86) (0.00459) (0.00446) (0.00147) 
 -0.848 1.075 1.101 -1.502 
 [-2.23 ; 0.53] [0.46 ; 1.70] [0.50 ; 1.71] [-2.51 ; -0.50] 
Number of FSEDs operated -258.1*** -0.0100* -0.00998* 0.00466 
 (85.48) (0.00559) (0.00549) (0.00313) 
 -7.932 -0.691 -0.693 1.630 
  [-13.08 ; -2.78] [-1.45 ; 0.06] [-1.44 ; 0.05] [-0.52 ; 3.78] 
 Area All All All All 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 







Table 24. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 2 to 10-mile radius, Metropolitan hospitals – Ordinary Least Squares results. 
 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
  CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 











Number of FSEDs in area -117.4 -0.000540 -0.00110 -0.00563 
 (109.0) (0.0220) (0.0218) (0.00539) 
 -2.905 -0.0348 -0.0713 -1.951 
 [-8.19 ; 2.38] [-2.81 ; 2.74] [-2.85 ; 2.71] [-5.61 ; 1.71] 
Number of FSEDs operated -256.9*** -0.0118** -0.0117** 0.00324 
 (89.03) (0.00589) (0.00579) (0.00319) 
 -6.357 -0.760 -0.764 1.124 











Number of FSEDs in area -84.89 0.0288* 0.0292* -0.00798** 
 (61.11) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.00335) 
 -2.101 1.855 1.899 -2.765 
 [-5.07 ; 0.86] [-0.11 ; 3.82] [-0.08 ; 3.88] [-5.04 ; -0.49] 
Number of FSEDs operated -256.8*** -0.0120** -0.0120** 0.00328 
 (88.97) (0.00589) (0.00579) (0.00319) 
 -6.357 -0.775 -0.779 1.135 












Number of FSEDs in area -14.17 0.0211*** 0.0214*** -0.00641*** 
 (28.09) (0.00650) (0.00626) (0.00176) 
 -0.351 1.362 1.393 -2.220 
 [-1.71 ; 1.01] [0.54 ; 2.18] [0.60 ; 2.19] [-3.42 ; -1.02] 




 (88.99) (0.00585) (0.00574) (0.00320) 
 -6.365 -0.791 -0.796 1.163 












Number of FSEDs in area -21.28 0.0145*** 0.0147*** -0.00520*** 
 (23.04) (0.00460) (0.00446) (0.00149) 
 -0.527 0.935 0.958 -1.803 
 [-1.64 ; 0.59] [0.35 ; 1.52] [0.39 ; 1.53] [-2.82 ; -0.79] 
Number of FSEDs operated -256.3*** -0.0126** -0.0126** 0.00351 
 (89.08) (0.00588) (0.00577) (0.00321) 
 -6.343 -0.815 -0.820 1.217 
  [-10.66 ; -2.02] [-1.56 ; -0.07] [-1.56 ; -0.08] [-0.96 ; 3.40] 
 Area Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 






Table 25. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 6-mile radius, All Hospitals – Instrumental Variables results. 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
 CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of FSEDs in area -998.8* -0.136 -0.130 -0.0652 
 (545.1) (0.114) (0.112) (0.0408) 
 -30.70 -9.342 -9.013 -22.80 
 [-63.53 ; 2.14] [-24.67 ; 6.00] [-24.29 ; 6.27] [-50.76 ; 5.16] 
Number of FSEDs operated 321.4 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.0245 
 (369.0) (0.102) (0.101) (0.0263) 
 9.879 23.94 24.13 8.579 
 [-12.35 ; 32.11] [10.20 ; 37.68] [10.40 ; 37.86] [-9.46 ; 26.62] 
Population over 65 years old 0.243 0.000220*** 0.000230*** 0.000234*** 
 (0.393) (8.32e-05) (8.09e-05) (4.56e-05) 
Median household income 15.67*** 0.00110** 0.00112** 0.000176 
 (2.620) (0.000540) (0.000535) (0.000239) 
Number of beds 6.310*** -5.34e-05 -4.72e-05 3.80e-05 
 (0.520) (6.97e-05) (6.92e-05) (2.44e-05) 
Population in poverty 0.413** 9.79e-05** 0.000102*** -9.97e-05*** 
 (0.171) (3.95e-05) (3.87e-05) (1.88e-05) 
      
Radius (miles) 6 6 6 6 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area All All All All 




R-squared 0.188 0.049 0.057 0.075 
Number of hospitals 3,160 3,160 3,160 3,160 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Number F Stat. 19.23 19.23 19.23 19.23 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Number p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Operated F Stat. 18.06 18.06 18.06 18.06 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Operated p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Hansen J Over id Stat 0.122 1.987 1.735 17.73 
Hansen J Over id p-value 0.727 0.159 0.188 <0.001 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 12.19 12.19 12.19 12.19 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id Stat. 34.47 34.47 34.47 34.47 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 







Table 26. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 6-mile radius, Metropolitan Hospitals – Instrumental Variables results. 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
 CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of FSEDs in area -823.1 -0.152 -0.152 -0.0718* 
 (538.6) (0.110) (0.109) (0.0379) 
 -20.37 -9.772 -9.891 -24.86 
 [-46.50 ; 5.76] [-23.61 ; 4.07] [-23.76 ; 4.00] [-50.59 ; 0.87] 
Number of FSEDs operated 329.1 0.338*** 0.340*** 0.0178 
 (373.5) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0254) 
 8.146 21.78 22.13 6.158 
 [-9.98 ; 26.27] [9.00 ; 34.57] [9.30 ; 34.97] [-11.08 ; 23.40] 
Population over 65 years old 0.629 0.000165* 0.000174** 0.000159*** 
 (0.416) (8.64e-05) (8.45e-05) (4.70e-05) 
Median household income 21.70*** 0.00154** 0.00156** -0.000151 
 (3.583) (0.000700) (0.000696) (0.000291) 
Number of beds 6.679*** -7.52e-05 -7.03e-05 2.61e-05 
 (0.544) (7.46e-05) (7.43e-05) (2.63e-05) 
Population in poverty 0.549*** 0.000116*** 0.000118*** -9.94e-05*** 
 (0.169) (3.79e-05) (3.72e-05) (1.85e-05) 
      
Radius (miles) 6 6 6 6 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan 




R-squared 0.185 -0.006 -0.006 0.104 
Number of hospitals 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Number F Stat. 18.55 18.55 18.55 18.55 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Number p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Operated F Stat. 17.43 17.43 17.43 17.43 
Sanderson-Windmeijer excluded Operated p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Hansen J Over id Stat 0.00108 1.588 1.242 17.37 
Hansen J Over id p-value 0.974 0.208 0.265 <0.001 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 11.71 11.71 11.71 11.71 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id Stat. 33.71 33.71 33.71 33.71 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 







Table 27. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 2 to 10-mile radius, All Hospitals – Instrumental Variables results. 
 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
  CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 











Number of FSEDs in area 3,145 -1.622 -1.582 -0.226 
 (5,135) (1.250) (1.225) (0.371) 
 96.65 -111.8 -109.9 -79.19 
 [-212.6 ; 406] [-280.5 ; 57.0] [-276.7 ; 56.9] [-333.2 ; 175] 
Number of FSEDs operated 116.9 0.306*** 0.307*** 0.00786 
 (284.3) (0.0911) (0.0898) (0.0210) 
 3.592 21.10 21.35 2.750 
  [-13.54 ; 20.72] [8.8 ; 33.40] [9.12 ; 33.58] [-11.6 ; 17.14] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 3.050 3.050 3.050 3.050 











Number of FSEDs in area -130.9 -0.349 -0.333 -0.134 
 (1,074) (0.271) (0.267) (0.0860) 
 -4.022 -24.07 -23.15 -46.87 
 [-68.7 ; 60.66] [-60.7 ; 12.5] [-59.6 ; 13.3] [-105.8 ; 12.1] 
Number of FSEDs operated 68.74 0.349*** 0.348*** 0.0221 
 (307.1) (0.0943) (0.0935) (0.0244) 
 2.113 24.02 24.17 7.724 
  [-16.4 ; 20.6] [11.3 ; 36.8] [11.4 ; 36.9] [-9.0 ; 24.4] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 5.719 5.719 5.719 5.719 
Hansen J Over id Stat 1.610 1.337 1.160 13.15 








 (336.1) (0.0680) (0.0673) (0.0239) 
 -25.31 -8.959 -8.754 -26.19 
 [-45.5 ; -5.1] [-18.1 ; 0.2] [-17.9 ; 0.4] [-42.6 ; -9.8] 
Number of FSEDs operated 458.0 0.373*** 0.372*** 0.0471* 
 (401.2) (0.108) (0.107) (0.0277) 
 14.08 25.71 25.86 16.48 
  [-10.1 ; 38.2] [11.2 ; 40.2] [11.3 ; 40.4] [-2.5 ; 35.5] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 15.61 15.61 15.61 15.61 












Number of FSEDs in area -720.9*** -0.0886* -0.0862* -0.0629*** 
 (262.0) (0.0493) (0.0487) (0.0186) 
 -22.15 -6.102 -5.988 -21.99 
 [-37.9 ; -6.4] [-12.8 ; 0.6] [-12.6 ; 0.6] [-34.7 ; -9.2] 
Number of FSEDs operated 604.9 0.386*** 0.384*** 0.0610** 
 (437.9) (0.109) (0.108) (0.0299) 
 18.59 26.56 26.70 21.33 
  [-7.8 ; 45.0] [11.8 ; 41.3] [12.0 ; 41.5] [0.8 ; 41.9] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 16.03 16.03 16.03 16.03 
Hansen J Over id Stat 0.00435 2.250 2.026 21.98 
 Area All All All All 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 





Table 28. Freestanding Emergency Departments within 2 to 10-mile radius, Metropolitan Hospitals – Instrumental Variables results. 
 
  Volume Case Mix Payer Mix 
  CASETA CMI TACMI DSHPT 











Number of FSEDs in area 2,759 -1.708 -1.714 -0.258 
 (5,009) (1.216) (1.200) (0.357) 
 68.28 -110.1 -111.5 -89.51 
 [-174.7 ; 311] [-263.8 ; 43.6] [-264.4 ; 41.5] [-332 ; 152.7] 
Number of FSEDs operated 169.6 0.289*** 0.291*** 0.00166 
 (287.6) (0.0910) (0.0901) (0.0217) 
 4.197 18.64 18.92 0.576 
  [-9.75 ; 18.15] [7.15 ; 30.14] [7.43 ; 30.40] [-14.13 ; 15.3] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 2.850 2.850 2.850 2.850 











Number of FSEDs in area -80.45 -0.364 -0.360 -0.150* 
 (1,081) (0.264) (0.262) (0.0837) 
 -1.991 -23.49 -23.39 -52.05 
 [-54.4 ; 50.4] [-56.9 ; 9.9] [-56.8 ; 10] [-108.9 ; 4.8] 
Number of FSEDs operated 128.3 0.334*** 0.335*** 0.0152 
 (317.4) (0.0941) (0.0935) (0.0244) 
 3.175 21.54 21.79 5.258 
  [-12.2 ; 18.6] [9.6 ; 33.4] [9.9 ; 33.7] [-11.3 ; 21.8] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 5.707 5.707 5.707 5.707 
Hansen J Over id Stat 0.594 0.857 0.613 11.31 








 (332.7) (0.0666) (0.0661) (0.0226) 
 -16.89 -9.306 -9.347 -27.68 
 [-33.0 ; -0.7] [-17.7 ; -0.9] [-17.8 ; -0.9] [-43.0 ; -12.4] 
Number of FSEDs operated 445.2 0.366*** 0.367*** 0.0412 
 (403.0) (0.107) (0.107) (0.0270) 
 11.02 23.57 23.90 14.29 
  [-8.5 ; 30.6] [10.0 ; 37.1] [10.3 ; 37.5] [-4.1 ; 32.7] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 15.13 15.13 15.13 15.13 












Number of FSEDs in area -590.2** -0.102** -0.102** -0.0668*** 
 (257.3) (0.0483) (0.0480) (0.0176) 
 -14.61 -6.594 -6.655 -23.16 
 [-27.1 ; -2.1] [-12.7 ; -0.5] [-12.8 ; -0.5] [-35.1 ; -11.2] 
Number of FSEDs operated 567.3 0.383*** 0.385*** 0.0573* 
 (436.9) (0.109) (0.109) (0.0293) 
 14.04 24.69 25.01 19.85 
  [-7.2 ; 35.2] [10.9 ; 38.5] [11.1 ; 38.9] [-0.05 ; 39.8] 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 
Hansen J Over id Stat 0.125 2.022 1.663 22.27 
 Area Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 
Share Percent. 





Table 29. Payer Mix ad hoc analysis, Number of Freestanding Emergency Departments in area – Instrumental Variables results. 







Number of FSEDs in area 2.800* 1.070* 0.375*** 0.254*** 0.224*** 
 (1.654) (0.583) (0.145) (0.0938) (0.0841) 
 979.3 374.2 131.2 88.98 78.23 
 [-154.6 ; 2113] [-25.46 ; 774] [31.74 ; 230.7] [24.64 ; 153.3] [20.58 ; 135.9] 
        
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. F Stat. 4.079 5.298 21.39 29.74 26.43 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. p-value 0.0435 0.0214 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 4.079 5.298 21.39 29.74 26.43 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id Stat. 4.099 5.307 21.84 30.29 26.91 













Number of FSEDs in area 1.933 0.680* 0.247** 0.170** 0.149** 
 (1.243) (0.382) (0.105) (0.0695) (0.0618) 
 669.7 235.5 85.41 58.82 51.67 
 [-174.4 ; 1514] [-23.77 ; 495] [14.27 ; 156.5] [11.65 ; 106] [9.715 ; 93.62] 
        
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. F Stat. 3.579 5.837 21.04 28.16 25.68 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. p-value 0.0587 0.0158 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 3.579 5.837 21.04 28.16 25.68 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id Stat. 3.607 5.854 21.85 28.99 26.31 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id p-value 0.0575 0.0155 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 
coefficient. In brackets is the 95% Confidence Interval of this percent change. FSED: Freestanding Emergency Department. 
CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 




Table 30. Payer Mix ad hoc analysis, Number of Freestanding Emergency Departments operated – Instrumental Variables results. 







Number of FSEDs operated -0.261* 
 (0.133) 
 -91.27 
 [-182.7 ; 0.13] 
   
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. F Stat. 8.537 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. p-value 0.004 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 8.537 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id Stat. 9.034 



















   
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. F Stat. 8.274 
Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak id. p-value 0.004 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV Stat. 8.274 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id Stat. 9.026 
Kleibergen-Paap Under id p-value <0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level. In italics is the percent change in the outcome represented by the 




CASETA: Cases adjusted by transfers. CMI: Case mix index. TACMI: Transfer-adjusted Case mix index. DSHPT: Disproportionate 




Figure 1. Number of FSEDs by state, 2005 and 2013 
 





Figure 2. Number of visits in FSEDs, 2005 and 2013 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10 Percent of hospitals with an FSED within radius 
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